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ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT:

The purpose of the thesis is to explore the effects

of time perception and threat perception by decision-making
elites on the decisions they make during crisis periods of in
ternational conflicts.

A series of four decisions involving

World War I, the Korean War, (US and Chinese involvement) and
the Cuban crisis will be analyzed using qualitative content
analysis techniques to evaluate the efficacy of the following
hypotheses:
A.

As perceived threat increases, time is seen as an

increasingly salient factor.
B.

As the perception of threat increases, decision

makers focus on immediate future needs to the exclusion of
long range considerations.
C.

The shorter the perceived time available to decision

makers, the fewer real alternative courses of action will be
considered.
Floyd Vincent Churchill Jr«
Department

of

Government

The College of William and Mary in Virginia

THE ROLE OF THREAT AND TIME PERCEPTION
IN

INTERNATIONAL

CRISIS

INTRODUCTION
"One of the great organizational problems
for mankind is the control of violence or
the control of conflict situations to the
point that procedural

institutions axe
1

adequate to handle it” •

It is unlikely that any student of mankind would serious
ly dispute this statement by Kenneth Boulding.

Violence, con

flict and war have been problems of major importance since
history was first recorded.

As man became more sophisticated

in his approach to the World in which he lived, he also became
more accomplished in his ability to generate violence and
destruction.

With the advent of the

nuclear era, this fright

ful ability to destroy took a quantum jump to levels beyond
the comprehension of any man.

In such an environment the impera

tive put forth above, became considerably more compelling than
it was even a generation ago.
The reaching of this goal has proved highly elusive.

1
Kenneth E, Boulding, Conflict and Defense
(New York, 1962) 225.
2

As

of this writing, there stiril exists no general theory of conflict which is acceptable to the various social sciences#

2

Authorities in each field have tended to approach the pheno
menon of conflict and its control from highly parochial view
points#

If a comprehensive general theory is to be developed,

it will require contributions from a wide range of social
science disciplines: history, sociology, psychology, anthro
pology, political science and communications and organization
theory to mention but a few#
It is with this realization that this work is offered for
inclusion into the body of research being done to narrow the
gap that exists within and between the various branches of
social sciences#

The objective of the author in preparing this

work is to produce something of value and importance, however
modest, to the multi-disciplinary approach to the study of
specific facets of the conflict situation: in this instance,
the role of threat perception and time in crisis decision
making#

It is the opinion of the author, both as a student of

political science and as a professional soldier, that the con
clusions of this study are of some merit and can, along vri.th
more substantial research, assist in developing the instruments

2

James E# Dougherty, Contending Theories of International
Relations (New York, 1971) 138.

4
required to atenuate conflict situations.

It is not claimed

that this work provides definitive answers to all it studies,
but rather that it is a positive addition to a growing body of
knowledge dealing with a nebulous quality of existence called
"conflict1'.
The two factors chosen for observation here (threat per
ception and time) were not chosen in an arbitrary manner.

As

a student of military history, my attention has been drawn on
numerous occasions, to the salieney of these factors in crisis
decision-making.

It is the contention of the author that a

better understanding of these two elements in the conflict en 
vironment can be of both immediate practical value to those who
are expected to make decisions in high stress situations, and
of longer range value in the development of more adequate hypo
theses to explain the phenomenon of conflict in its many forms.
As briefly mentioned above, a distinct effort has been
made in this research to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach
to the task at hand.

The crisis periods which follow were

analyzed by using a framework built around the decision-making
approach to crisis decision outputs.

However, elements from

other "micro" analysis approaches, such as the psychological
factors, ware combined with "macro" approaches such as geography,
political science, and systems theory to overcome the major
objections usually noted to the decision-making,

approach.

Because of the variation in information available, ac
cess to primary sources, and structural organization of that
information which was available, the analysis of the crisis
under investigation will be conducted using the traditional
case study method or, as Ithiel De Sola Pool refers to it, a
3
“qualitative analysis" approach*
Accordingly the conclusions
reached will be supported, in the main, by illustration and
argument, rather than by more systematic presentation of a
larger body of evidence•

Qualitative Analysis presupposes that

the decision-makers were purposeful in their actions and com
munications, and infers goals, expectations and attitudes by a
reverse process than that used by the decision-makers*

In

some ideal world in which all required information would be
available, the process of investigation could proceed in the
same manner in which decisions are made*

The process might be

graphically portrayed thus:
Situat
ional
Factors

Elite
Es
timates

Elite
Expectat ions

Elite
Policy
Inten
tions

Spkrs
propa
ganda
goal

Content
Indic
ators

Unfortunately the real world is seldom in accord with the ideal
model*

As a consequence of the non-availability of some docu-

3

Ithiel De Sola Pool, Trends in Content Analysis
(Urbana, 1959), 7*

6
merits and the impossibility of knowing definitely the unrecorded
attitudes of key decision-makers, the analysis of information
actually occurrs in an inverse sequence*
4
graphically in the following pattern:
Content
Indi
cators

Spkrs
Propagan
da Goal

Elite
Policy
Inten
tions

The process appears

Elite
Expect
ations

Elite
Esti
mates

Situa
tional
Factors

In all cases extensive use is made of all primary sources
available to determine the psychological state of the partici
pants as closely as possible*

Additionally, information on rele

vant symbolic behavior (such as the involvement of troops) was
gathered to expand the researcher's perspective in viewing the
crisis periods in question.
As it is hoped that this work will prove fruitful to
others pursuing similar research, so the hypotheses for the pre
sent study were selected from previous work by Charles F. Hermann
in this field*
1*

The hypotheses to be investigated here are:

5

As the perception of threat increases, time is seen

as an increasingly salient factor*

4
Ibid. 18.
5

Charles F. Hermann International Crisis: Insights From
Behavioral Research (New York, 1972) 320-321.

7
/

2*

As the perception of threat increases, decision

makers focus on immediate future needs to the exclusion of long
range considerations*
3*

The shorter the perceived time available to decision

makers the fewer real alternative courses of action will be con
sidered*
Given the lack of consensus on basic concepts and term
inology in the study of conflict and crisis, it is appropriate
at this point to define a few key terms*

Threat perception and

time compression will be discussed in some detail in the first
chapter, and so will be omitted here*
need definition are listed below.

The other terms which

The particular definitions

are those used by Kenneth Boulding in his book Conflict and
Defense (1962).
1.

6

Conflict - any situation in which both parties are

aware of the incompatability of potential future positions and
each wishes to occupy a position that is incompatable with the
wishes of the other.
2.

Crisis - a situation of unanticipated threat to

important goals/values and restricted decision time.
3*

Decision-making elites/group - that group of

6
Kenneth E* Boulding. Conflict and Defense
(New York, 1962) 27*
*

—
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8
individuals which the person responsible for key decisions seeks
to have available to him and whose opinions he considers im
portant in the decision-making process*

A final introductory remark is briefly to explain the
organisation of this thesis*

The reader has already been intro

duced to the methods to be used, and the importance of this study
from the a u t h o r ^ perspective.

The first chapter will provide

a conceptual framework with which to analyse the information
presented in four case studies.

The intent is that the reader

will have a reasonable understanding of what happens to people
in high threat situations characterised b y compressed time, and
can use this information to determine if the actions and state
ments of the decision-makers (DM) surveyed in the case studied
fit this pattern*
The four case studies are organized so as to provide
sufficient background inf ormat i on to put the decision-maker *s
actions in perspective.

This is followed in each case by a

detailed look at the crisis period itself and concluded with
a section which discusses the conclusions which can be drawn
from that individual case.

The cases were chosen specifically

to attempt to get different nationalities and general situa
tions under study.

In the work at hand, the studies include

two American cases, one Chinese case, and one all-European case,
covering a time span from 1914 to 1962.

9
The final segment of the thesis presents a brief review
of the propositions under investigation, the posited actions
under stress situations, and the conclusions drawn in the indi
vidual case studies*

The results will then be collected and

synthesized, and soma new working propositions derived*
A series of appendices have been provided for the con
venience of the reader and contain information that is relevant
to that particular case study but is too lengthy or awkward to
fit conveniently into the body of the study*

A detailed

chronology is provided for all crisis periods, and a list of
decision making units and/or maps are provided for several of
the studies*

CHAPTER I
THREAT AND TIME PERCEPTION AND THE
CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
According to Henry Kissinger, "What is relevant for
policy” in times of crisis "depends not only on academic
7

truths but also on what can be implemented under stress"«

Observations by others who have experienced or studied in
ternational crisis vary widely*

Consider the following:

A decision-maker may, in a crisis,
be able to work out easily and
quickly what seems in normal times
to both the "academic" scholar and
the layman to be hypothetical, unreal, complex or otherwise difficult*
In every case, the decision (to go to
war) is based upon a careful weighing
of the chances and of anticipated con
sequences * * * In no case is the de
cision precipitated by emotional ten
sions, sentimentality, crowd behavior,
or other irrational motivations*^

7
Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy"
in James N* Rosenau (ed) International Politics and Foreign
Policy (New York, 1969) 265*
8

Herman Kahn, On Escalation - Metaphors and Scenarios
(New York, 1965) 38.
9

Theodore Abel, "The Element of Decision in the Pattern of
Wa-r". American Sociological Review (April 1944) 855.
10

11
I saw first hand, during the long days,
and nights of the Cuban crisis, how
brutally physical and mental fatigue
can numb the good sense as well as^Jhe
senses of normally articulate men.
How dn individuals and groups respond to the pressures
and tensions of crisis?

Do we tend to approach such situa

tions with high motivations, a keen sense of purpose, extra
ordinary energy and enhanced creativity?
Kahn suggests, the mother of invention?

Is necessity, as
Or, is our capabili

ty for coping with the problem impared, perhaps even to the
point suggested by Neustadt*s phrase "the paranoid reaction,
characteristic of crisis behaviorn?^^
The answers to these questions are always important
for persons who find themselves faced with crises.

They

assume extraordinary significance when the individuals are
national leaders and the context is that of a contemporary
international crisis:

upon the ability of national leaders

to cope with situations of intense threat may depend on the
lives of millions, if not the future of mankind.

The purpose

of this study is to attempt to improve on our present under-

Theodore Sorensen, Decision-Making at the White House
(New York, 1967) 76.
Richard E. -Neustadt, Alliajnce Politics
(New York, 1970) 116.

12
standing of national leaders in time of grave crisis.
The thrust of this initial chapter will be to provide
the reader with a theoretical map, or model, against which
the actions of the decision-makers in the following case
studies can be more easily understood.

In an effort to

facilitate the logical development of the model, the chapter
has been divided into five major sections.

The first section

introduces the idea of conflict as a phenomenon, in broad
perspective, and identifies the level of analysis and ap
proach to be used.
In the second section, the conflict environment is
described, through a discussion of its major components;

In

the third section of the chapter, the role of perception in
conflict is set forward.
With the general conflict environment and role of per
ception thus developed, the fourth section provides a dis
cussion of the two principle factors under investigation,
threat and time.

Decision-making behavior is here discussed

in relation to the observed responses to high threat situa
tions and restricted time (e.g., the phenomenon of precicvcd reduction in available decision, time hereafter re 
ferred to as "time compression") and the effects of in
creasing threat.

The fifth and final section of the chapter

is the discussion of the conclusions to be drawn.

The major

points developed in the sections on conflict as a phenomenon,
the conflict environment, the role of perception, and the
effects of threat and time compression on crisis decision
making are combined to provide the intellectual setting for
the case studies which follow.
Conflict as a Phenomenon
Conflict as a phenomenon, spans the breadth of human
activity.

It is frequently divisive and destructive, caus

ing a deterioration of the relationships between man and wife
friends, families, groups and nations. But, conflict can also
12
.
.
be positive.
plays a role m preventing stagnation,
stimulating interest, providing a medium for airing problems,
and it may provide a way to test and assess one *s self.
Politics, in its essence, is a conflict process by which
limited resources are authoritatively allocated.
Certainly it is well beyond such an undertaking as the
present one to attempt to discuss and analyze all aspects of
conflict.

It is generally accepted that while conflict in

its many forms is deserving of further study, of particular
importance in this age of intercontinental missiles and
multiple warheads is the study of potentially destructive

14
conflict.

Within this generally definable universe of

conflict, attention will be focused on that part of the con
flict environment that deals with crisis periods in inter
national relations.
The choice of this restrictive definition has several
roots.

First, the study of conflict is in general a poorly

defined enterprise; the more general one becomes, the more
disagreement is encountered about definitions, appropriate
boundaries, and analytical tools.

Second, there is a grow

ing body of literature that suggests that decision-making
almost always is done in small, ad hoc groups during times
of great threat to important values or goals.

13

Conse

quently, the considerations of manageability, general agree
ment on important factors, and availability of relevant in
formation led to the selection of the level of analysis.
The conventional method used in a study of this nature
is to adopt either an individual or systemic approach to
ordering information.

However, the perspective used here

is a combination of both, attempting to take into considera-

13
See works of George Grosser or Charles F. Herman for
further discussion.
14

James E. D 0ugherty, Contending Theories of International
Re Ip.tions (New York, 1971) 141*

15
tion individual traits such as temperament, physical
fatigue and experience coupled with organizational factors
such as intelligence estimates and advice of interested
agencies which act to set the range of acceptable choices
and alternative solutions.

The section which follows will

combine the salient factors from these various approaches
and develope the setting, or environment, in which threat
and time compression will be studied
The Conflict Environment

The conflict environment which the decision-making
elites occupy is not primarily a physical situation (although
it may have some influence) but rather it is a mental and
procedural construct which encompasses the decision-making
group.

15

Conflict characteristically occurs through a

process of escalation which can be over an extended period
or a very short one, and blatent or subtle.

This can be a

physical or psychological process, but its primary impact
is on the state of men's minds; it is as Herman Kahn says
a ,fcompet it ion in risk taking".1^
escalation can be many.

The purposes behind this

Generally they fall into motive

15
John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication
(New York, 1969) 32.
16

Herman Kahn, On Escalation - Metaphors and Scenarios
(New York, 1965) 3.

16
categories, such as an intentional show or wrecklessness
(intended to cause caution on the opponent1s part), a
demonstration committment, or preparations for escalation
b y the opponent*

17

However, escalation is not in and of itself conflict*
Certain relationships characterize the conflict environment#
Ole Holsti suggests that conflict occurs either from en
croachment on another nation or its preserves, or from
18
aggravated competition between two expanding national units*
The latter can occur either in the form of a physical effort
to control or from an attempt to gain psychological/ideo
logical dominance in a given area.

Obviously, these con

flicts can occur at different levels of intensity and are
frequently a nirrture of economic, ideological, political and
military factors*

Resulting strategies and modes of resolu

tion may shift as one or the other basic sources of power
19
becomes salient•
An environment which is characterized by conflict
tends also to have certain characteristics which define it*
Karl Dcutsch classifies them as: (1) idcntification of issues,

17
lb id *
19

Ke nnet h W . BOu Id ing , Conflict and Defense

17
(2) perception of threat and inadequate time,
of clear territorial limits,

(3) a lack

(4) communications problems,

(5) incomplete information, and finally,(6) willingness to
use force*

20
Identification of Issues

The process of identifying the central issues is a
deceptive one*

It is closely related with, and, the major

determinant of, a nation*s willingness to go to war*

John

Burtonnotec^ that it cannot be assumed that the issues b e 
lieved to be those in dispute are in fact the ones that
21
caused the active conflict*
Normally conflict occurs after
an escalation process in which issues are rarely clearcut
and well defined, rather they tend to go through a sublima
tion and transfer process by which they become intertwined
with symbology of great emotional appeal within that society.
Whatever the issues may have been, the conflict becomes one
between the "good1* (our nation) attempting to stand up for
what is "right” against the "bad” (the other side)*

It is

frequently the case that the event that leads to open

20
Clagett G* Smith, Conflict Resolution: Contribution of
the Social Sciences
(North Dakota, 1971) 32*
21
John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication
(New York, 1969) 24*

18
violence is just the one that triggered the loaded gun*

22

Certainly nobody would claim that all Europe so loved Arch
duke Ferdinand that they were willing to risk their very
existance for his revenge, or that America felt such a strong
bond of kinship with the South Koreans that they were bound
to come to the rescue*
The Perception of Threat and Inadequate Time
The perception of threat, and the perception of inade
quate time (time compression) are intimately and subtly re
lated to the identification of issues, discussed above*
While the effects of threat and time on decision-makers will
be presented in some detail in section four of this chapter,
it is appropriate at this point to identify the central
nature of threat in the conflict environment*

It can

reasonably be stated that a sense of threat is a necessary
condition for a conflict environment to exist.
As the issues are identified by decision-makers, and
various factors of the conflict environment come into play,
they interact in the formation of a set of perceptions of
the relationships between rival decision groups*

These

perceptions, though they may first be held tentatively,
will come to be accepted as a true reflection of what is

22
John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication
(New York, 1969) 24*

19
actually occurring.

The sense, or level, of threat con

tained in these perceptions will directly determine the
priority that that problem recieves among the decision-making
group.

Additionally, it appears that as the perceived threat

increases, some of the normal problem solving capabilities
become less effective.

The perceived threat, then, acts to

alter the decision-making situation.

It acts, in fact, as

a basic determinate in defining what types of problem
solving techniques can be or will be used.
The sense of inadequate time being available to
accomplish a given task, or "time compression", is also
involved in this process of successively less effective
decision-making.

As the level of threat rises, time both

becomes more important, and is perceived as being less and
less adequate.

A more detailed discussion will be presented

below, but suffice it to say here that time compression is
closely related to increased threat perception and effects
the attitude of decision-makers involved.
Territorial Limits
As used by Deutsch, territorial limits can be physical,
psychological or ideological.

These territories, or spheres

of influence, have roughly defined outer limits which fre
quently do not coincide with the conception of other states
as to where these boundaries are.

The psychological

"territory” Is closely related to the concept of "critical
boundary" which will be explained further on in the chapter.
Basically, it refers to the self-conception of that country1
appropriate place and role among nations.

An example of

this might be Britain*s self image as "keeper of the balance
and guarantor of safe passage on the oceans of the world
prior to World War I.

Ideological territory refers to the

position along the continuum between the extremes of politi
cal posture and a struggle between two nations to claim the
leadership in any given direction.

The ideological conflict

between China and Russia during the last 20 years is an
example of this•
Communication Problems
Communication problems as an element of the conflict
environment is significant enough a problem that a separate
section on the topic will be presented later in the chapter.
For that reason no more will be said about it at this point
other than to indicate its role in the conflict process.
That role is to make accurate gauging of the opponent more
difficult, consequently making appropriate responses to the
opponent’s actions a matter of great uncertainty.
Incomplete Information
The next characteristic of the conflict environment

21
identified by Deutsch was incomplete information.

23

John W.

Burton, in his book Conflict and Communications, noted
during periods of crisis and attempts at crisis management,
that by the nature of the limited time available, decision
makers are characteristically forced to make decisions on
information, they know is incomplete and only partially
verified.

Particularly since World War II? the mere volume

itself of communications has become a tremendous problem.
Messages are inexplainably delayed (as with several of the
key messages in Korea in 1950) or cross messages from the
opposing decision-makers

(as in W Qrld War I).

One of the

great concerns of the Kennedy decision group was a fear of
the Russians discovering U-2 flights over Cuba. They were
forced to plan under the continuous realization that their
24
available time could be cut to zero at any moment.
A moment of reflection on the environment and chara
cteristics above, and the framework these create, immediately
point out that the concept of conflict environment is by no
means a simple nor very straight f orward one.

Conflict may

23
Richard C. Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision-Making
(New York, 1962) 237.
24
J* L. Aranguren, Human Coinraunicat1on
(New York, 1967) 65.

22
exist in ideological, economic, military or political
25
spheres, or any combination of them simultaneously.
Additionally, the relative importance of any one area can,
and will, vary at different times depending on its saliency
to the decision-making unit*
With the overview of conflict and the conflict e n 
vironment also complete, there remains one factor which
needs to be discussed briefly before proceeding into an
investigation of the role of perception in international
crisis decision-making*

This last factor which is germane

to the discussion is the willingness of a nation to
escalate and/or resort to violence and the process of
identifying issues involved in a given conflict situation*
Willingness To Use Force
The final consideration, that of willingness to use
the force available, is a problem which is extremely
critical to the calculations of all decision groups as
they approach the point of war or no war.

Willingness to

go to war is a very complex phenomenon and almost wholly a
product ox that particular culture; the nation’s critical
boundaries are intimately involved in this process*

The

25

Lincoln Bloomfield, Amelia Liess, Controlling Small W a r s :
A Strategy for the 1970’s (New York, 1960) 16*

23
Americans are probably the best example today of a nation
with tremendous war potential and an almost impenetrable
fog around what issues will and will not cause a violent
reaction.

Certainly the Russians and North Koreans had

every reasonable expectation that the United States would
not put its own armed forces in the balance for a country
it had already said would have to depend on itself and was
26
declared to be outside the US Asian defense perimeter.
The Role Of Perception In Conflict
It is appropriate to note at this juncture that this
work will deal strictly with the perception of threat, and
perceptions of compressed time, rather than attempt to
determine if there actually was a high threat situation,
and, or if there actually was adequate time.

This position

is both justifiable and appropriate in that the decision
makers studied reacted to the situation as they percaived
it to be;

27

whether their perceptions accurately reflected

the real situation is of no particular consequence here.
This section will provide the reader a discussion of the

26
Carl Berger, The Korean Knots
A Military-Political
History (Philadelphia, 1968) 104.

27

Charles F. Hermann, International Crisis:
Behavioral Research (New York, 1972) 64.

Insights from

24
role of perception and the major factors that influence
the perception development process*
Kenneth Boulding provides support for this approach
to crisis investigation in his statement on the basic conditions that must exist for conflxct to occur*

28

These basic

requirements are stated to be:
1*

Both organizations must be present in the

images of the decision-makers of the other
Arri'n r>“i

2.

+

*i or*

.

Decisions on the part of decision-makers

must affect both organizations in valuesignificant ways*
3.

Decisions must affect the image of the

other organization so that the second
organization is affected unfavorably*
Obviously Mr. Boulding1s emphasis is on the psycho
logical perception of the situation*

While some portions

of reality may well affect any decision that an individual
makes, it cannot affect the original decision process if
the decision-maker did not perceive this reality or perceive
it as relevant*

28
Kenneth E* Boulding, Conflict and Defense
(New York, 1962) 151*

25
While it is almost impossible to identify for any
specific individual the exact composition of his perceptual
set, it is possible to identify the major factors which
appear to influence the decision-making process, particu
larly those effecting high level decisions.

Although the

influence any one factor has on an i n d i v i d u a l s perception
may vary, it will be comprised of stimuli falling generally
into the categories of (1) culture,

(2) communications,

(3) spiral of effect, and (■4-) information.
factor, critical boundary,

An additional

is included in this discussion

as a particularly useful tool in understanding this
specialized and narrow segment of perception development.
Culture
A factor of tremendous significance in considering
og
perceptions in culture*
Ail incoming stimuli are
evaluated in terms of the reference images characteristic
to the society of the receiving individual.

Consequently,

the effort to convey a particular message between persons
of different cultures

and heritage becomes almost unattain

able when placed in a conflict environment in which there
is no direct communications

(a characteristic of virtually

29
Bernard Berelson, C ontent Analysis in Communications
Research, (New York, 1971) 68.

26
all conflict situations which led to war).

30

Studies have

shown that information is limited b y the conceptual frame work of the receiving decision-maker, the tendency being to
receive, select, or reject, information as it conforms to
preformed belief/value patterns.

31

As Heinz Fischer noted:

"The extent to which individuals/groups understand each
other is a function of how much their world views and frames
32
of reference overlap*1.

This problem of common reference

also manifests itself in the great difficulty that is ex 
perienced even in developing a common "yardstick,f by which
each party can measure its respective power positions in a
conflict.

Such measurement devices (which allow compara

tive measurements) tend to appear only in the resolution
phases of conflict•
Communications
A very complex field of study intimately connected
with perception as developed above is that of communications
and in particular what John Burton and Richard Merritt call

30
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(New York, 1962) 55.
32
Roger Fisher, International Conflict
(New Y0rk, 1969) 480.
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"effective communication"*

Burton posits that whether a

communication makes for harmony or conflict depends in
large part on its content and perception of that content*
He defines effective communication as "the deliberate con
veying and accurate receiving and interpretations of what
was intended to be conveyed".

33

Standing as a formidable

bloc to efforts to accomplish this are a host of difficul
ties, most connected with what is called the cognitive
organization or process.

34

This is the system of cate

gories for classifying and ordering the events of exper
ience and language development and acts to restrict our
understanding of the symbolic meaning of words.
An important facet of this process of communications
is that of feedback.

35

This mechanism is the means by which

the decision-makers will evaluate the actual, or perceived,
effect of its previous decisions in relation to what it had
attempted to do.

The ability of a given D M unit to
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accomplish what it set out to do will be in part a func
tion of how well it is able to interpret this feedback
information.
Spiral of Effect
The impact of perception, culture, and stress on the
communications process has been studied by many prominent
researchers in the field of conflict environment.

In

Conflict and Defense. Boulding discusses what is known as
36
the Richardson Process.
This is a process by which a
movement by one side so changes the field of the second
side that he must move causing the first to move again,
etc.

This process is also called the "Spiral of effect"

and this term will generally be used in this paper.
An excellent example of the spiral of effect is the
naval construction race between Britain and Germany at the
turn of the 20th Century.

Germany, with its "Copenhagen

complex" desired a fleet adequate to cause Britain to think
twice before launching a surprise attack (also called the
"risk fleet" concept).

Britain, however, perceived this

as an insidious building program intended to wrest control
of the seas from Britain and put England at an enormous

36
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disadvantage*

Britain*s response was to increase her own

building program, particularly in the Dreadnaught class,
thus aggravating and, to the German mind, substantiating
Germany's tears, generating greater efforts on her part.
This spiral of effect can, and has, led to disasterous re 
sults, if not effectively throttled.

Richard Merritt's

mediated stimulus - response paradigm of the process pro37
vides a useful model of this phenomenon:
STATE B

STATE A

R
R
S
Percept•
of
Percep, of jstmnt of A's
B's attit.&jPlans & In- R Behav.>S A's attit.&
Itent
Output
Behav. twds
Behav. twds? Twds B
B
A

S
Strants of B'sj
Plans & In| R
tent.
j 1
Twds A
j

Behavioral Cutout
R = Response

S = Stimulus
Information

Another aspect of importance in a conflict situation
is the volume of information involved.

Heise and Miller

found that "the performance of a small group depends upon the
channels of communications open to its members, the task which
the group must handle and the stress under which they work".
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As the volume of information directed at the decision
making group rises, the search for information within the
communication system tends to become less thorough, selec
tivity becomes greater.

Unpleasant information and that

which does not support the group's preferences is likely not
39
to be accepted unless the factual support is overwhelming.
Holsti observed in his work on the communications
process in stress situations that communications increased
during crisis in an uneven manner - intra-alliance communi
cations increased significantly while inter-alliance de
creased.

Also, as perceived threat rose, both incoming and

outgoing messages reflected increasingly simple and stereo
typed assessments of the situation.

This in turn caused

the number of alternative solutions considered to be decreased.

40

The hunt for alternatives was also found to be

restricted by tendencies for decision groups to get smaller
and technological factors to decrease the objective decision
time •
The Critical Boundary
Another concept which is closely related to those
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developed above, and which is useful as a cognitive or
ordering device for understanding the actions of such
nations as Communist China and Great Britain, is that of
"Critical Boundary".

41

This is a verbalization of the idea

found in the writings of many authors in the field that
every major nation has a physical or psychological boundary
or series of boundaries that, when penetrated, causes an
increasingly disruptive reaction in the country whose
boundaries are crossed, until such a point is reached that
the violated nation feels compelled to go to war.
(interior)
imperative.

The final

boundary*s protection is seen as an absolute
No resource is left unused in the effort to

keep any outside force from penetrating or establishing in
fluence over it.
These boundaries are frequently a product of many
influences, including tradition, the state of the military
art and public opinion.

Critical boundaries may or may not

coincide with the actual physical boundaries of a nation/
state.

Two good examples of critical boundaries which

extend beyond physical boundaries are Britain prior to
World War I in France, and the Chinese Peoples Republic in

41
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Korea in 1950«

Many of the documents released after the

First W Qrld War showed that the key British decision
makers considered it unacceptable to have the north coast
of France under the control of any power inimical to British
sea power*

Britains committments and "informal" (and secret)

talks between 1907 and 1912 were precisely aimed at ensuring
a British presence in the area if need be*

42

In the case of China, its extended critical boundary
43
appears to run somewhere through the middle of North Korea*
Although the sense of "natural" borders extending beyond
their current boundaries has long been a Chinese belief, an
exact demarcation of this boundary was not even clear to
the Chinese themselves until the US First Cavalry Division
prepared to cross the 38th Parallel*
This last case points out one of the insidious quali
ties of this phenomenon; it is almost never commonly d e 
clared and may not be more than a vague formulation for the
formulation for the appropriate decision-making elites
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themselves*

As a consequence, the ability of the oppos

ing decision-makers to anticipate the psychological d i s 
ruption that will occur and alter its own actions is
virtually nil*

Past experience seems to support the idea

that one group becomes aware that it has penetrated this
boundary only by the violent reaction it tends to percipitate after already having done so*

45

The Effects Of Threat And Time On Decision-Making
With the broad areas we call the conflict environment
and the role of perception in conflict now discussed, and
the significant factors relevant to this research which act
on and within it identified, it is time to develop the role
of threat perception and compressed time in crisis decision
making*

For the purposes of this discussion, the definition

to be used for threat perception will be that of Charles F*
Hermann*

He defined perceived threat as: "the degree of

anticipated harm to the nation observed in both the seman
tics of crisis communications and in the character of situa46
tional fears"*
It is necessary to say a word about
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semantics; with the diversity of approaches to the study
of conflict, it is not surprising that different authors
use different terras to describe the same general phenomenon*
In the author *s research and in quotes in this work, the
terras "stress", and in some cases "emotion11 have been used
as a synonym for "threat"as used here*

47

Response To Threat Situations
George Grosser in his book, The Threat of Impending
Disaster * identified the sequence a decision-maker goes
through as he becomes cognizant of a threat*

48

Research

has shown that an individual or group will not allow itself
to stay in a situation of high stress (threat), but will
utilize a series of escalating defensive mechanisms to attempt to settle the problem.

49

Grosser posits a three-stage

process by which a threat situation is defined in a manner
that is compatable with the receiver’s cognitive organization*
This series of mental processes serves to:

(1) verify the
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aspects of the threat (nature, probability of becoming
more severe, locus, timing, and severity)j

(2) to authentic

cate it (definition, distortion of image, and selection);
and (3) elaborate it (manageability, escapability, postponability, survivability and tolerance to it)*

The threat

as thus conceptulized is then analyzed in relation to the
importance of the threatened value or goal; that is to
determine if it is a "shell" (relatively unimportant) or
"core” (very important) value*

50

Effects Of Increasing Threat
Others working in this field point out that stress, or
threat, at low levels of intensity, have positive effects
on and indeed appear to be a necessary precondition to
individual and organizational problem-solving*

51

For simple

problems of a quantitative nature, moderate amounts of stress
can produce increased output for limited periods of time*
Unfortunately, important political issues nearly always are
marked by complexity, ambiguity, and the lack of stability,
and usually demand responses that are qualitative rather than
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quantitative#

It is exactly this qualitative ability that

is most likely to degenerate under increasing stress or
perceived threat.

52

Most research findings suggest a curvilinear relation
ship between threat and performance; a moderate level helps,
while increasing the level eventually begins to disrupt the
decision process until finally it breaks down almost
completely#

53

A series of landmark investigations were conducted by
Postman and Bruner on the effects of high threat on per
ception#

Their conclusion was that
"Perceptual behavior is disrupted,
becoming less wall controlled than
under normal conditions, and hence
less adaptive# The major dimensions
of perceptual functioning are af
fected: selection of perceptions
from a corap lex field becomes less
adequate and sense is less well
differentiated from nonsense; there
is maladaptive accentuation in the
direction of aggression and escape,
untested hypotheses are fixated
recklessly” •5z-
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In concert with these findings, a host of researchers

55

have identified the following effects of high-stress (threat)
on dec is i on -maker s s
1*

Increased random behavior*

2.

Increased rate of error*

3.

Regression to simpler modes of responses*

4*

Problem - solving rigidity*

5*

Diminished focus of attention.

6*

Reduced ability to discriminate the dangerous

from the trivial*
7.

Reduced scope of complexity of perceptual activities.

8.

Loss of abstract abilities*

9*

Loss of complexity in dimensions of political

cognition*
10.

Lowering of tolerance for ambiguity.

11*

Tendency of both decision-making groups to have

mirror-images of their opponents options vs. their own.
The Effects Of Time Perception
Closely allied with the phenomenon of high threat, and
the other major factor to be investigated in this work,
is the perception of the adequacy or inadequacy of time

55
See works by Snyder, H o 1sti, Hermann and Zines for
greater discussion*
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(time compression)*

As with threat perception, time per

ception is a critical factor.

Generally investigators

have found that the ability to judge time becomes impaired
under high stress - as the threat is perceived to become
56
greater, time appears to move faster*
Several of the case
studies to be investigated here are particularly striking
examples of this manifestation.

Additionally coordinated

long range planning is conspicuously not present in high
threat situations as the immediate threat is percieved to
be of such over-powering importance that long range consid57
erations appear to have little or no relevance.
Other
manifestations of time pressure identified by several re
searchers are s
1.

Increased propensity to rely on stereotypes.

2.

Problem-solving becomes progressively

disrupted.
3.

Focus of attention is narrowed.

4.

Impedes use of available information.

5.

Impedes exploration of alternatives.

6.

Creates early group agreement.
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As Holsti noted in concluding his discussion of the above
subjects in his book CRISIS - ESCALATION - W A R , E v i d e n c e
suggests the paradox that as the intensity of a crisis in
creases, it makes creative policy making both more impor58
tant and less likely” •

This author tends to agree*

It may be of some assistance at this point to depict
graphically the relationship between high threat and time
compression and individual and decision group reaction.
The relationship on the individual level can be depicted as
59
follows:

Chart on next page
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Individual Reaction to High Threat

+ repetition of prior responses
regarded as successful

disruptive %
stress

reduction in
cue awareness

- alternatives available to
self and allies

rigidity in
perceptions

+ simple behavior
- comprehension of tacit
bargaining moves

rigidity in cog
nitive process
reduced time
DersDactive
S'

+ zero-sum interpretation
of situation
^

- consideration of domestic
political consequences
shift in priority of
objectives

Source:

Ole B. Holsti, Crisis-Escalation - War

Plus and minus signs indicate positive and negative relation
ships, respectively for both diagrams*

By way of comparison,

the organizational response to high threat/time compression
60
appears in the following manner*

See chart on next page
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Conclusion

With the major theoretical sections of the chapter
now exposed to the reader, it is appropriate at this
juncture to take a moment to reflect on the most important
elements of the model as developed.

As stated in the intro

ductory remarks, the chapter was divided into five major
sections.

The theoretical portions of this chapter dealt

with conflict as a phenomena, the conflict environment, the
role of perception, and the effects of high threat and time
compression on decision-makers.
The objective of the author in presenting the factors
selected and the order of presentation was to provide the
reader first with a general overview of the environment in
which the decision-maker characteristically finds himself.
It was seen that the individual(s ) concerned must deal with
a host of extraordinary influences in processing information
and attempting to understand the situation they face.

Fre

quently even the most fundamental problem, that of identify
ing the issues in dispute and their importance to the
various competing decision-making groups, is itself not
clearly resolved.

Multiplying this sense of uncertainty

in international crises are many factors which influence
the decisions-makers in both manifest and latent ways.

43
The decision group is directly confronted with the
necessity of dealing with the considerable problems of
attempting to communicate effectively their intentions and
properly deciphering their opponents actions*

Additionally,

the type, speed, and volume of communications itself creates
considerable problems for the decision-makers attempting to
cope with a crisis.
Intimately tied with these manifest problems of crisis
periods are several factors which effect the decision pro
cess in more subtle, less well defined ways.

A vague sense

of "proper11 national territorial limits, which is almost
never articulated, combines with the willingness of decision
groups to use force to provide additional factors which
become part of the total environment acting upon, and being
acted upon, by the decision-makers in question.
It can readily be seen that the general setting in
which crisis decisions must be made is ill-defined and con
tinually changing.

How individuals react to these changes

was shown to be immediately related to how that change was
perceived by the receiver.

The intensity of threat per

ceived has a direct effect on the sense of critical boundary
and the extent of the effects of the spiral of effect
phenomena.

These factors tend to combine with the other

influences characteristically present in the crisis situa-

44

ation to create a sense of rising threat to important
values and perceived inadequate time in which to deal sat
isfactorily with the threat presented.
Once the reader had been introduced to the conflict
environment in general and has seen the importance of per
ception in its processes, the hypothesized effects of threat
and time can then be considered in somewhat greater detail.
This section provided the model of how people in decision
making groups in high stress situations tend to react
according to the theory to be investigated here.

It was

seen that they are expected not to allow themselves to stay
in this situation for extended periods.

As stress increases

qualitative abilities are expected to diminish, the individ
uals concerned may become less adaptive, have-greater
difficulty with complex issues, and tend to accept untested
hypotheses.

Characteristically their actions may be e x 

pected to show increased rates of error, problem solving
rigidity, and a reduced ability to discriminate the danger
ous from the trivial.
Time compression in this theory, is seen to have
similar but separately identifiable traits of its own. Clo s e 
ly related to high threat situations, the decision-makers
involved may be expected to sense that their reaction time
is inadequate and that time is moving more rapidly than

45
normal.

Long range planning our theory would suggest, is

generally not considered.

The focus of attention in time

compression situations we would expect to narrow, impeding
efforts to explore alternatives.

These forces according to

the theory, tend to move decision groups towards early con
sensus on a limited number of possibilities or on a specific
choice.
In sum the notion under investigation here is that
threat perception and time compression have significant
effects on decision-making groups in their efforts to react
to situations in a conflict environment.

The reader should

now have before him a mental construct of the factors thought
to be characteristically present in a crisis environment, and
how individuals,

if they are under the influence of per

ceived high threat and/or time compression, will be expected
to react.

In the following chapters the reader will be p r e 

sented with a series of four case studies involving differ
ent nations and decision-making groups under crisis condi
tions.

The reader is asked to keep in mind the character

istic actions and attitudes of those under high stress
conditions put forward in this theoretical framework, and
determine from the material presented in the case studies
which follow, if the three propositions offered for investi
gation stand up to the light of actual experience.

CHAPTER II
EUROPE GOES T O WAR:

1914 CRISIS

At approximately 10:45 am on 28 June 1914, Archduke
Francis Fredinand, heir apparent to the

throne of Austria-

Hungary, was struck down by an assassin's bullet in the pro
vincial capitol of Sarajevo*

This singular act of political

violence by an unknown Serbian nationalist against an unpopular
member of the house of Hapsburg was to unleash bitterness,
hatred, and fears accumulating since 1870*

The resulting con

flagration was to spread with amazing speed to engulf all of
Europe in war in the period of one month*

Before the last shot

was fired and the last bugle sounded taps, some 26 million men
lay dead;

61

a generation of young men were gone*

This was to

be the most destructive war the world has known*
How does such a tragedy happen? Why do presumably sane,
rational statesman who have dealt with crisis after crisis,
many of them, on their merits, more threatening than that of
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Sarajevo,suddenly fail to stop the headlong plunge into a war
that all know would have no victors - only greater and lesser
losers?

It would certainly be simplistic to say that any single

factor or group of factors can explain a multi-faceted phenom
enon such as this*

It is, however, possible to identify the

more salient forces acting on these statesmen for a more de 
tailed investigation.

With this in mind, it will be the purpose

of this chapter to take the concepts, relationships and working
hypotheses regarding threat and time perception developed in
the previous section and use them to analyze in some detail
the events occurring in Europe from 28 June 1914 to 4 August
1914.
It became readily apparent to the researcher that the
amount of information available on the origins of the First
World War is only slightly less vast than the war itself.

In

order to accommodate the purpose of this study it was necessary
to be highly selective as to the extent and depth of the mater
ial to be presented.

Because of the restricted space available,

the period prior to June of 1914 is covered only in highlight.
However, it is the opinion of the researcher that although none
of the period between 1870 and 1914 is discussed in great depth,
that the information presented is adequate to provide the
central facets of the historical "definition of the situation"
needed to interpret events of the period in question.
In an effort to develop a coherent picture of the various

48
forces acting upon the major participants during that fateful
period in the summer of 1914, this chapter will address the sub
ject by using two different ordering devices*

The period from

1870 to 1914 will be divided topically to discuss underlying
causes, secret alliances, and Balkan problems*

The events from

the Archdukevs assassination on 28 June through England's dec
laration of war on 4 August will be surveyed chronologically by
country*

The first section will be so organized as to facili

tate conceptulization of the major factors comprising the
decision-makers field of perceptions, while the latter will
assist the demonstration of the role of threat, time, and altern
atives considered during this crisis period*
The underlying causes of any modern conflict are a complex
conglomeration of numerous factors, some of which are more
important than others*

Sidney Fay divides the most important
62
of those governing World War I into five major groupings*
These are: Militarism, Nationalism, Economic Imperialism, the
Newspaper Press, and Secret Alliances*
MILITARISM:

The importance and impact of militarism is

closely related to the system of secret treaties that
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characterised the period prior to World War I#

"Militarism”

is a vaguely used term, but does include three definite con
cepts:

1) the dangerous and burdensome mechanism of great

standing Armies and large Navies with attendent evils of es
pionage , suspicion, fear, and hatred; 2) the existence of a
powerful class of military and naval officers headed by the
General staffs, who tend to dominate civilian authorities dur
ing times of crisis; a form of military "culture” - of a kind
which characterized Prussia prior to the First World War, but
to some extent every military elite of the period*

This cul

ture amounted to a form of military social Darwinism in which
machismo, strict discipline, and caste typified the unwritten
but generally accepted "rules of the game"*

63

Two key indicators of militarism were increased spending
and size*

This became the norm for all European armies follow

ing the Franco-Prussian war*

The proportions of this can

readily b 2 seen by a comparison of the per capita expenditure
on arms at the beginning and end of this period*
for the major powers were as follows:

Expenditures

64
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Nat ion

GB

FR

RUSS

IT

GBR

AOS

1870

$

3.54

2,92

1.28

1,38

1.28

1.08

1914

$

8,23

7.07

3.44

3.16

8.19

3.10

(NOTE: Figures adjusted for inflation)
The arguments presented by the military and their supporters
in all countries are a classic example of the r,spiral of effect"
discussed in the previous chapter - each saw the others in
creased armaments as a "threat to world peace" and demanded
parallel increases to "maintain security".

This pressure for

expansion was fanned by the alliance system; both by the per
ceived threat of the Triple Alliance

of being surrounded, and

by actions such as France's massive loans to Russia for strateg ic rai Iroad construct ion ,
It was seen as the supreme duty of all armies to be ready
to defend the state by force of arms at any moment.
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The

direct consequence of this imperative was the constant pre
occupation of all General Staff's to be ready to make or meet
attack in the shortest possible time.

To do this, extremely

detailed and extensive plans were made and yearly revised to
provide minute and detailed plans for the total process of
mobilization, movement to the frontier and frequently initiation
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of an attack.

66

Military officers generally held the view that

it was advantageous to take the offensive and get to the enemy
before he could complete his own mobilization; forcing him to
fight in his territory.

Given the tremendous complexity of these

mobilization plans and the idea that any effort to stop them
once started left that party open to easy attack, coupled with
the relative parity, except for Russia, of mobilization times
which were normally about two weeks, the critical nature of time
becomes immediately obvious.

Sidney Fay stated the essence of

this critical point when he pointed out that "a general mobili
zation, according to prevailing military opinion, actually did
make war inevitable.
halt once begun . . .

It was a process virtually impossible to
It is always at a crisis, precisely when

it is most difficult for diplomats to keep their heads clear and
their hands free, that the military leaders exert their influ
ence to hasten the decision of war, or get the upper hand alto
gether”.
This was to prove to be one of the two great evils of
militarism.
hand.

The other was only to be seen as war was close at

This was the fact that these military plans and treaties

were made in great secrecy, always unknown by the public, and
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only partially known and understood by the rest of government*
Sidney Fay cites Saznov's failure to comprehend the impossi
bility of partial mobilization and Bethmann-Hollweg*s failure
to understand the implications of the Schlieffen plan as pain
ful examples of this phenomenon*
NATIONALISM:

The impact of nationalism on the inter

national environment provided some of the basic underlying, if
not immediate, reasons for the war*

In its chronic form it

appeared as Pan-Slavismf Pan-German ism and Revanche*

It acted

particularly to precondition the decision-makers in all countries
towards interpretation of incoming stimuli to agree with pre
formed negative views of the adversary*

This was a central

factor in Russo-Austrian affairs and probably was the primary
moving force in the Balkan situation that led directly to the
67
immediate occasion of the world war*
It was through this
highly negative perceptual "lense" that the continuously worsen
ing balance of power for the Triple Alliance after 1911 was
viewed*

68

The obvious conclusion was that, given the polar

perceptive sets of the various nations, the situation could not
help but get progressively more dangerous for the Central Powers*
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BCONOMIC IMPERIALISM:

Although not as central an issue

as the two discussed above, the political-economic colonization
process did have an effect, particularly on the attitudes of the
average citizen*

The last quarter of the 19th century saw a

marked increase in new colonies*

With the emergence of Germany

in the race for colonies, and the reduced number of desirable
areas still open for colonization, national interests and pres
tige of the major colonizers*
These imperialist activities and the continous friction
that was so much a part of it contributed to the environment
which made war possible*

The major effects of economic imperia69
lism on pre-war attitudes were three in number*
Tnese were:

It 1) provided ample verification that military might was a
necessity and strengthened the ”might makes right” faction;
2) acted to further estrange England and Germany and push
England towards de facto alliance with France; and, most import
antly, 3) requirements to protect the new possessions were an
important force in the development and increasing pace of the
arms race*
NEWSPAPER PRESS:

The true effect of the newspapers is

not, even today, very well understood*

Universally the press
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tended to inflame nationalist feelings, misrepresent the situa
tion in favor of its country and supressed factors which favored
peace.

70

Numerous efforts to establish better relations were

seriously hampered by the jingoistic attitude of the press.

It

was not unknown for "newspaper wars1' to be conducted between
rival country papers.

Fay comments: "between 1908 and 1914

there was no single topic which was so frequently a subj'ect of
complaint and discussion between the representatives of Germany
and Russia as the maligning influence of the Pan-Slav and Pan71
German press in stirring up bad blood between the two countries".
The newspapers played another role; they were an excellent,
and oft-used, disclaimer against some requested action by
another country. "Public opinion would not allow it", proved
to be a combination of convenient myth and troublesome fact.
The location along this continuum depended on the country in
question, with England to one end and Russia to the other.
SECRET AJLLIANCES:

The last of the major factors is one

of the two major determinants of July 1914.

Europe had long

been characterized by continuous alliance making, breaking and
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modification*

In order to keep the subject from exploding be

yond the proportions of the purpose of this paper only those
alliances of some significance will be identified*

The normal

convention of starting with the results of the Franco-Prussian
war of 1870 will be followed here*
In general it can be said that the alliance system as it
72
evolved was the single greatest cause of the war*
It divided
Europe into two armed camps each of which initially acted to
restrict actions of its members but additionally guaranteed that
when war did come all would be involved*

Each group felt bound

both by treaty and by fear to uphold its coalition lest it lose
power in the precarious balance that existed*

In reading the

documents from each of the governments one is struck by the
constant reference to the need to maintain solidarity of
alliances*

The comment of Sir Eyre Crowe early in the crisis

is a good example of this attitude*

"What ever we may think of

the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia • • • the
bigger cause of Triple Alliance v* Triple Entente is definitely
engaged • • • Our interests are tied up with France and Russia
in this struggle • ♦
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1870-1890;

The period from 1870 to 1890 was dominated by

the implications of the French defeat in 1871 at the hands of a
new German nation.

The two over-riding factors were first the

loss by France of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, and second,
the change in the balance of power in which France was to be
diplomatically isolated for this 20 year period through the
skillful maneuvers of Bismarck.

The first factor was to prove

to be the more important in that the city of Strassbourg, which,
while legally now a German city, was in spirit and mind still
avidly French.

Around this issue the revanche phenomenon

coalesced; "the wound that would not heal"*
All of the treaties of this twenty year period (1870-1890)
were combinations of Germany with Russia and sometimes Austria*
The results of an abortive effort by Russia to create a "Greater
Bulgar" and gain access to the Bosporus Straights forced Russia
to accept the Congress of Berlin and ended the Emperor League
of 1872-1878 with an estrangement between Germany and Russia.
As a consequence of perceived threat of military action, Germany
created the Austro-German Alliance of 1879.

This treaty was to

become the bedrock of the German diplomacy until the collapse
of the Empire in 1918.
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1890-1907:

The period of 1890 to 1907 was ushered in by

a dramatic switch in the balance of power with the FrancoRussian entente of 1891.

Many reasons prompted this combine

but most basically were the fear of being isolated, (feeling
themselves to be isolated and threatened by Germany) and the
fear of an expanded German economic and military presence, both
on the continent and in colonial areas.
The first step in changing this entente into an alliance
occurred in 1894 with the agreement between French and Russian
military representatives that "the two armies would have to
act simultaneously in case of an attack from which they both
75
had to fear the consequences".
The key factor of the agree
ment was that mobilisation was to be considered the same as a
declaration of war.

General Boisdeffe (French representative

at the treaty signing) said to the Czar the day after the
signing: "mobilization is the declaration of war.
is to oblige your neighbor to do the same . . .

To mobilize

it is placing

oneself in the situation of an individual who, with a pistol
in his pocket, should let his neighbor put a weapon to his
76

forehead without drawing his own".
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During this period England had remained in "splendid
isolation" and was relatively uninvolved in the intrigues of
the alliance process*

However by 1898 it was becoming pain

fully obvious to the British leaders that isolation was becom
ing progressively less splendid as time went on.

The events

of the Fashoda affair, Niger boundary, and the Kruger telegram
convinced these leaders that it was necessary to adopt a change
in outlook.
Three key personages were to emerge during this period
who ware to have a profound effect on England and its movement
77
towards alliance with France. / In France the rise of Delcasse 1,
who was determined to secure rapproachment with England, began
efforts to draw England into alliance against the Central Powers.
This was reinforced in Britain by the succession of Edward VII
to the throne and Lord Lansdovme to the Foreign Ministry in 1902.
Both man ware known Francophiles.

This created an atmosphere of

cooperation which led to the Entente Cordiale in 1904, and,
following the Moroccan crisis of 1905, to closer cooperation b e 
tween France and England which culminated in the Anglo-French
military and naval "conversations" between 1905 and 1912. These
talks began as informal discussions but with the approval of
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Sir Edward Grey, the British and French naval staff elaborated
technical arrangements for joint war action, which became the
basis of the strategic plans of both countries*

These “conver

sations" were to continue without full cabinet knowledge down
78
to the summer of 1914*
1907-1914:

The remaining seven years prior to the out

break of war can be characterized as a period of growing oppo
sition between alliances and a growing sense of interdependency
among members of each alliance*

This crystallization began

slowly but accelerated markedly with the advent of the Balkan
wars*
Three factors appear as central to the rising tempo of
tension and increasingly threatening environment in which
Europe found itself during this period*
the German fear of encirclement •

79

First of these was

With the Russo-English

de'tente Germany saw herself as out manned, outgunned, and
perceived, correctly it might be added, that this balance of
power was daily becoming less favorable to the Central Powers*
This was to be to her a salient concern during those days in
July 1914, both in making imperative the maintenance of a solid
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alliance and as a filtering device for incoming information*
The second major factor was German-English naval competi
tion*

This was a critical concern in the minds of the English

and created an atmosphere of suspicion and antagonism*

The

Germans were affixed with the so-called "Copenhagen complex”,
a fear of an undeclared attack on Germany, and saw their in
creasing naval strength as a means to security against sur
prise attack; to the British it was an attempt to dominate
England's vital trading routes*

Here again is an excellent ex

ample of the spiral of effect in application*
The final consideration was the continuous deterioration
of Russo-German relations from 1908 onwards*
deterioration was the Balkans*

Central to this

A series of actions by Austria

and Serbia from 1909 to 1913 put Germany in the position of
imposing settlements on Russia to maintain peace*

The memory

of these forced humiliations to Russian prestige and pride was
to play a significant role in Russia's march to mobilization*
Now that we have briefly surveyed the major events and
conditions which formed the perceptual environment for the
decision-makers, there remains but one portion of the situation
that is not yet adequately developed - the Balkan problem*
Certainly the Balkan situation is one of the fundamental causes
80
of the war*
was the almost continuous conflict in this
80
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area that accelerated three important trends:
the antagonism between the two alliances;

82

81

1) sharpened

%
2) stimulated the

general increase in armaments; and 3) led to increased inter
dependency between members of each alliance and a distrust of
any initiative of the other*
Basic to the conflict in the Balkans was the conflict b e 
tween Russian desires to extend its influence on the Balkan
peninsula, and realize its long-standing goal of controlling
the Bosphorus Straights, and Austria*s attempts to preserve the
status quo.

Couple this with the ambitions of Serbia, Bulgaria,

Rumania and Greece to include all peoples of their race within
theix boundaries, and a rough approximation appears of the e x 
plosive mixture that existed.
This electrified atmosphere became hyper-charged by
events which occurred between 1908 and 1913.

The nBuchlau

Bargain” of 1908, which was to be an exchange between Austria
and Russia over two Serbian provinces and diplomatic support
for Russian movement towards the Straights, degenerated into
the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909.

The Serbians, incensed over

Austria.*s annexation of Bosnia, were eventually forced to
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accept a settlement championed by Germany*

The end results

produced several important consequences, most important of
these being that: 1) it caused Europeans to distrust Austrian
diplomacy; 2) Germany got the blame fox Austrian actions as the
supposed "guiding hand"; 3) Austria had received its first
"blank check" support 4) Serbia was led to believe that it
could count on Russian support in the future to retake Bosnia;
5), most importantly, it generated tremendous activity in
Russia to reorganise, expand and re-equip its army, and prepare
83
for a war now considered by many to be inevitable*
The outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 was to
dramatically alter the power balance in such a way as to be
disasterous to Austria*

Serbia was now in possession of an

army of 200,000 men with 200,000 reserves*

84

In the event of

war with Russia, Austria would be forced to send a significant
portion of its army to the Danube*
in an untenable position.

Thus Austria found itself

Something would have to be done to

prevent Serbia from solidifying its position and becoming
increasingly dangerous to the continued existence of the AustroHungarian Empire*
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The stage is now s e t ; it remains but for the assassins
to strike.

We have seen how militarism, Balkan problems, and

most basically a series of secret alliances have moved the
primary actors towards their destiny.

Europe has become two

hostile camps, whose mutual mistrust, feax and misconcep
tions have built from the modest agitations of 1904-1907 to the
crescendo of hatred and perceived threat that was the summer
of 1914.
Much has been written on thatmorning in Sarajevo and it
is of no value for the purposes of this study to
length with the assassination itself.

linger

at any

Suffice it to say that

the assassins were highly politicized young Serbian nationalists
who ware trained by menders of a secret Serbian revolutionary
society called the

T1Union of Death11(Ujedinjenje ili S m r t ) or,

more commonly, the Black Hand.
There were apparently four assassins
d u k e ’s route that day.

85

along the Arch

One assassin failed in an attempt to

bomb Franz Fredinand about 45 minutes prior to his demise at
the hand of a man named Princip.

Even this might not have

occurred had the driver not turned onto the wrong street and
stopped directly in front of the assassins to turn around.
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any case at approximately 11 o'clock the Archduke and his wife
both lay dead.
Because of the disjointed actions of the various govern
ments and the extended period of time between the death of
Frans Fredinand (28 June) and the delivery of Austria's ulti
matum to Serbia (23 July), it is most profitable to organize
this section of the paper by looking at each country individual
ly and its changing perceptions during this period.

Most

attention will be paid to the actions of Austria, Russia and
Germany in this process for, as the reader will see, it was
actions and perceptions of these decision-makers which are
essential to understanding the "why" of July 1914.
AUSTRIAN REACT ION:

To relate the role of threat and time

perception to the Austrian frame of reference it is best to
think back to the events described above.

Sidney Fay states

in a succinct manner the Austrian situation as they saw it:
"For months and years past there had been a growing conviction
among certain groups at Vienna that the political situation was
becoming dangerous and intolerable for Austria in the Balkans.
Thus even before Sarajevo, there was a general feeling on the
part of many officers at Vienna that something must be done to
prevent the decaying Hapsburg structure from crumbling
to pieces • . The news of the Archduke's assassination enormously

65

strengthened this fee ling •"
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General Conrad (Austrian Chief

of Staff) gives credence to the view with his comment at the
time.

"It was not a question of a knightly duel with "poor

little Serbia", he wrote, "nor punishment for the assassina
tion.

It was much more the highly practical importance of the

prestige of a Great Power . . . The Sarajevo assassination had
torn down the house of cards erected by diplomacy in which
Austria-Hungary had thought herself safe.

The monarchy had

been seized by the throat, and had to choose between allowing
itself to be strangled and making a last effort to prevent its
destruction*
It was with this disposition that Austria received word
of the Archduke's death.
to what should be done.

Vienna was initially undetermined as
As could be expected from the above

quotation, General Conrad urged immediate mobilization.

How

ever, before the Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, was will
ing to move he felt it essential to check on two items.

These

were to determine Berlin's attitude, and to determine what
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evidence was available to justify Austria’s proposed actions*
As a consequence a special emissary was dispatched to
Potsdam to see the Kaiser on 5 July*

The resulting promise of

complete support which came from this meeting for any proposed
Austrian action was a major factor in Austria’s aggressiveness*
Implicit in Berlin's "blank check" was the expectation of a
localized conflict and rapid action by Austria against Serbia*
This was not to be*

89

A series of events, prominently the

resistance of Count Tisza to starting a war, even after the
Kaiser's committment was procured, dramatically slowed down the
Austrian response*

With the kaiser's support assured, Berchtold

effectively ceased to listen to all outside information which
did not coincide with the corporate aim of the senior decision
makers in Vienna-that being to eliminate Serbia as a mortal
threat to the Empire*

Two pointed warnings from Russia on the

18th of July, and from Poincare' (who was visiting the Czar)
on the 20th were totally ignored, exhibiting classic symptoms
of the reactions expected under extreme stress discussed in the
first chapter*
It was not until 6 pm on 23 July that the ultimatum was
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presented to Serbia, timed so as to catch Poincare1 on the first
leg of a sea voyage home and thus out of communication*

A reply

was demanded within 48 hours to a document with a directness
with few precedents in diplomatic history*

As expected by those

who prepared the diplomatic note, Serbia could not accept all
of the demands made, although it did acquiesce to the vast
majority of Austria*s demands*

It took the Austrian ambassador

only long enough to scan the document to ensure the Serbs had
not met all demands, to state that the response was unsatisfactory*
RUSSIAN REACTION:

After the initial shock, the reaction

to the assassination was overshadowed by the continuing warnings
of Austrian responses against Russia and the newspapers indicat90
ing that they were glad to be rid of an enemy*
With the already supercharged atmosphere that existed in
the Balkans, the Russians knew that some form of action would be
taken by Austria*

With the passage of days after the assassi

nation and no action by Vienna, the Russian Chancellor, Saznov,
became increasingly anxious*

Saznov issued a statement on the

18th that "Russia would not be indifferent to any effort to
humiliate Serbia*

Russia could not permit Austrian menacing
91
language or military measures against Serbia"*
Saznov was

90
Edmond Taylor,'The Fall of the Dynasties
(New York, 1963) 256.
91
Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outlook of the
European War (London, 1915) 64*

68
beginning to perceive, increasingly, the rising threat environ
ment that was building up during this period.

Central to

Saznov9s concerns was the fear that Austria would conduct a
surprise attack that would humiliate Serbia directly, and there
by Russia indirectly.

The Chancellor9s positions and authority

had been jeopardized through recent Russian rebukes, strong PanSlav sentiment in the press and pressure from the militarists.
This sense of rising threat in both a personal and representa
tive plane was to reduce significantly the Chancellor9s
previous cautiousness.
The visit of Poincare9 at the critical juncture was to
add yet another, and probably irresistable, reinforcement to
the sense of overwhelming movement towards war.

The French

visit of 20-23 July was dominated by Poincare9 who directed
discussions towards measures to be taken in view of the in
creasing indications of Austria9s preparations to deliver a
strong ultimatum to Serbia.

Poincare9 wanted to strengthen

Saznov9s attitude towards Austria.

He wanted him to warn

Austria against marking unacceptable demands on Serbia and to
prevent him in case of need, from accepting any compromise
settlement which might be regarded as a diplomatic defeat for
the Triple Entente at the hands of Germany and Austria.
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On July 23rd the French President left on his return
voyage back to France, and Austria delivered Serbia the long*
feared ultimatum.

Bven though a note was surely anticipated,

Saznov was incensed, when he received it, by Berchtold's
method of purposeful deception, the severity of the note, and
the shortness of time permitted for reply.

In a real sense

the delivery of this note marks the beginning of the true
crisis period.

The Russians, and all other Europeans, really

entered a true crisis environment, characterized by an unan
ticipated situation and short decision time, with the revelaof the harshness of the Austrian note and the very limited
response period.

The next 10 days was to be a period of ex

treme stress, and increasing sense of national or alliance
threat, characterized, as David Singer noted, by the fact
that "not only in St. Petersburg, but everywhere in the
foreign offices of Europe, responsible officials now began
to fall under a terrible physical and mental stress of overwork, worry, and lack of sleep."
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However, it was in Russia that the reaction was the
greatest.

The feeling of the "inevitability" of war was now

rapidly growing.On 24 July Saznov's request for a partial
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mobilization, which was in fact militarily impossible, against
Austria was the most obvious manifestation of the quantum jump
in perceived threat*

The Chancellor, through reinforcement

of the French ambassador and the militarists, began to focus
singly on the preparation for war*
The mood in St* Petersburg on the next day was moving
inexorably towards the ”inevitable” war*

Fay sums up the re

sults of the ministerial council on the 25th when he wrote
that the "military leaders felt that a war between Austria
and Serbia was therefore a war between Austria and Russia and
therefore a wax between Russia and Germany*

They had no

doubt that Austria was about to begin the invasion of Serbia
—
—
94
as soon as the time limit /of the ultimatum/ expired•"
This
statement of perceived inevitable involvement is a reflection
of a basic assumption made by the Russian decision unit: that
because the real driving force was not Austria, but, Germany,
it was assumed that no move of this gravity could be carried
out without the full support of Berlin*

Given Russia's

slower mobilization rate and the importance placed on moving
first, it becomes readily apparent that time was beginning to
become a more salient factor*

This view was verbalized by
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the French Ambassador in a conversation with the British
Ambassador about the latter*s recommendation for a conference
when he said that ,rtime did not permit this, either Austria
was bluffing or had made up her mind to act at once*

In eith95
er case a firm and united attitude was our only chance • •"
The next morning brought news of Serbia's reply to the
ultimatum and Austria's rejection of it*

With this Saznov

saw his fears substantiated and ordered the initiation of a
"Period Preparatory to War"*

This mobilization technique was

devised to overcome Russia's slowness at mobilizing by get
ting the jump on actual mobilization by activitating some of
the slower processes*

This was to prove to be one of the

crucial events on the road to war, the obvious danger being
the likelihood that Germany would identify the actions being
taken as the mobilization itself*
GERMAN REACTION:

German action during this period was

primarily passive and reactive*

The key to Germany's "blank

check" lay in her perceptions of the European environment at
that moment*

The major factors involved were: 1) the view

that the monarchial tradition was so seriously threatened by
Pan-Slavism that further inactivity would be unconsistent
with self-preservation, 2} belief that Russia would not come
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to the aid of Serbia because of the horror of the assassin
ation of a monarch, 3) belief that Russia was not completely
recovered from the Russo-Japanese war, and 4) belief that
recent improvements in British-German relations would keep
England from giving France support*

96

German efforts during

this period of 28 June to 26 July were oriented on keeping
any possible Austro-Serbian conflict localized*

These efforts

were to be for nought however as the Triple Entente perceived
this action as a German "master plan" to alter the balance
of power in the Balkan's permanently*
known to Germany at this time*

However that was un

A major cause of the hectic

action later was in fact related to the Kaiser's firm belief
that the issue could be localized and his refusal to allow
the military to begin war preparations*
As the days passed after the Potsdam conference and
no action was forthcoming, Berlin began to become more
anxious*

Repeated efforts were made by Bechmann to gain

rapid action by the Austrians*

As mid-July approached and

it became more obvious that "localization" was unlikely, the
Kaiser began attempting to gain support for a "stop at
Belgrade" pledge and no permanent annexation of territory*
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These moves were frustrated by the Allies' distrust of German
intention and Austria's refusal to reply on the plan*

Still

the Kaiser refused to allow preparations for war to begin.
When Austria released its ultimatum to Serbia, Germany
committed a basic diplomatic blunder*

Berlin did not know

until 24 hours prior to delivery what the general contents
of the ultimatum were, yet she came out immediately in full
support of Austria's position.

This support was extended for

the same basic reasons that France extended her support to
Serbia; the fear that any separation of allies would put the
Triple Alliance in a perilous position vis a vis the Triple
Entente*

The impact of this was to completely discredit any

and all German attempts to disclaim responsibility for
Austria's action.

Thus, further German efforts to mediate

the situation were perceived as attempts to delay Allied
response and preparations so that Austria could present
Russia and France with a Serbian fait accomplis.
It was about this time that noticeable perceptions of
threat and compressed time became evident.

Reports came in

of Russian preparations and the adamant positions taken by
the Entente powers on the Kaiser's proposals.

Yet even

with the refusal of Austria's note by Serbia, the Kaiser
could not be pushed into military action.
believe war inevitable.

He did not yet
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FRENCH AND BRITISH REACTION:

With Poincare1 on the

high seas during the period from the 24th until the 29th of
July, the French acting foreign minister did nothing.

The

British reacted much the same but for different reasons. Not
being technically allied, London waited to see what the reac
tions of others would be.
As it became known that Austria was preparing a harsh
note for Serbia, England began to make considerable diplo
matic efforts in an attempt to get both sides to "conversa
tions" or a Hague tribunal, but to no avail.

Strong efforts

were also made to get Germany to exercise restraint on
Austria, while in the meantime Britain maintained she had
no ability to do likewise with France and Russia.

Berlin

was both reluctant to do this on principle, and in fact not
able to do it anyway•

With the delivery of the Austrian note,

Britain began to move slowly towards the commitment that the
Naval talks had virtually assured.
And so the stage is set.

Surprise in the form of

Austria's harshness and very short response time had injected
the crisis element into the events of July 1914.

Both sides

saw attempts at negotiation by the other as efforts to take
advantage of the situation to their gain.

Mirror images ex

isted between England and Germany of their own limited
abilities and the others* expanded capabilities, and hence

75

their opposites responsibility to stop their allies*

Both

coalitions had gone from minor levels of threat to the belief
that national prestige and existence was at stake*

Delayed

responses and unwillingness to take the first step had pushed
all parties into feelings of compressed time available*

All

that remained was for the act to occur*
Although it was discussed above, it is important here
to again briefly discuss the role that mobilization played
in the minds of all decision-makers in 1914*

As Viscount

Haldane indicated, "General mobilization by a great power was
generally understood to mean that it had only resorted to
its final step of putting the great military machine in motion,
with the automatic movement of troops to the frontier • • •
when it had finally concluded that war could no longer be
avoided"* 97

It is obvious then that mobilization was neither

ordered lightly nor seen as a small event by other countries*
The imperative of being first, to be fully mobilized and to
fight in other*s territory, has obvious implications on the
level of perceived threat and time from the events surveyed
above•
RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION:

If one event can be said to have

97

Viscount Haldane, Before the War
(New York, 1920) 36*

76
gone past the point of no return, it would have to be the
decision of Russia to mobilize on 29 July 1914*

News of the

Russian general mobilization caused military considerations
everywhere to take precedence over political considerations
and rendered futile and illusory all later diplomatic efforts
such as the German request to Russia to stop mobilization*

98

After failing to bluff Austria on the 26th with mobili
zation preparations, Saznov came to the conclusion that a
European war was inevitable with the news on the 28th of
Austria's declaration of war on Serbia*

The French Ambassa

dor indicated his country's "complete readiness to fulfill
her obligations as an ally in case of necessity"*

This

assurance eliminated any remaining question of action* Saznov
then approved the partial mobilization which had been ap
proved in principle on the 25th*

This was altered on the

29th to a general mobilization, as the military was able to
convince the Chancellor and the Czar that a partial mobiliza
tion was not possible without putting the country in extreme
danger if attacked by Germany*

The General's arguments were

reinforced by news of the bombardment of Belgrad and Germany's
warning that Russian mobilization would lead to German
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mobilisation*

The group opinion had solidified around the

opinion that war with Germany was unavoidable and that it would
be a mistake to postpone longer the general mobilisation or to
interfere with its succesful execution by first ordering a
99
partial mobilisation*
And so on 29 July 1914 Russia put
into motion a mobilisation machine she then could not stop*
GERMAN MOBILIZATION:

As in all other major European

capitals, events were happening and messages being passed in
Berlin at a torrid rate*

The situation had taken on an omi

nous tone on 26 July with the Russian preparatory steps for
war and French activity next to Alsace-Lorrain*

Facts known

by the Germans on the 27th were: 1) Russia had declared
"Period Preparatory for War" on 26 July, 2) France had
ordered home all divisions stationed outside of France and
3) France began guarding its railroads and had put the border
town of Kavono on a war footing*

However the Kaiser would

still not allow preparations, waiting for an answer on his
"stop at Belgrad” proposal*

This attitude was to receive a

jolt on 29 July as the result of the exchange of the "WillyNicky" telegrams in which the Czar indicated that mobiliza
tion had not just bagun but "decided on five days ago for
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reasons of defense on account of Austrian preparations"*

100

At this point the Kaiser decided he was being duped and made
no further efforts to prevent events that followed*
When the Germans learned of Russia's probable mobiliza
tion directive on the 30th they were in a panic*

Moltke

quickly saw that a two front war was about to explode upon
Germany and she was giving away her only trump card - the
ability to mobilize and strike more rapidly than her antago
nists*

The following day Moltke received irrefutable evi

dence that Russia had mobilized, with this the Kaiser re
lented and a state of "Threatening Danger of War" (the German
equivalent to Russia's Period Preparatory to War) was de
clared at 1300 hours 31 July.
It is essential to note here that the German General
Staff had long built its war plans on the belief that
Germany's only chance for victory was to strike rapidly in
the west, defeat France within 6 weeks, and move against
Russia*

In 1911 the Schlieffen Plan had been modified to

change the balance between the left and right wings, making
it absolutely critical that Liege be captured within the
first few days of the war*

This made mobilization a "stand
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pat and negotiate" basis impossible*

101

Thus once the decision

was made for mobilisation, Germany had necessarily to strike
the first blow*
The final card was played when Berlin was informed that
Russia could not stop its mobilization "for technical reasons"*
Seeing wax close at hand9 and believing speed her only chance
for survival, Germany ordered mobilization at 1700 hours on
1 August and declared war on 3 August 1914*
FRENCH MOBILIZATION: Poincare* landed at Dunkirk on
29 July and proceeded to Paris where he found military prepara
tions under way for mobilization*

Poincare*s major concern

during the period was with getting Britain to declare her
comitment to France and Russia, and taking military precau
tions in France*
mobilization*

No efforts were made to stop the Russian

The President was shown a series of preparations

being made by the Germans, virtually the same type of activi
ties reported to Berlin, Poincare* also found a telegram wait
ing for him from Saznov stating that, "not being able to
accede to Germany's desire /that Russia cease her military
preparations/, it only remains for us to hasten our arrange~
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ments and regard war as inevitable"*
101
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News received from the French Ambassador at St*
Petersburg on 31 July definitely confirmed Russia's mobili
zation order*

This, combined with word of Germany's declara

tion of "Threatening Danger of War", left little doubt in the
minds of the French cabinet that a European
evitable*

war was now in

General Joffre demanded complete mobilization,

stating that every delay of 24 hours would cause the initial
abandonment of 15-20 kilometers*

103

The Cabinet finally

authorized mobilization on 1 August (some 15 minutes before
the same action in Berlin)*
BRITISH MOBILIZATION:

The decision for England on

whether to Join France and Russia was made, or at least
heavily influenced, by a diplomatic blunder of major propor
tions by Bethmann-Holweg on 29 July*

That afternoon he

called on the British Ambassador, Goshen, to attempt to
secure Britain's neutrality*

During the conversation

Bethmann stated that, in regards to Belgium, he "could not
tell to what operations Germany might be forced by the
actions of France • • •"

104

The effect of this statement was

to cause opinion in London to believe that "Germany
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practically admits the intention to violate Belgium*s neu105
traility and is practically determined to go to war"*
The British would not accept an attack on Belgium for
several reasons: 1) Britain was unwilling to bargain on her
obligations to Belgium, 2} did not want to disgrace Britain's
good name by being part of a bargain for the conquest of
Prance, and 3) wanted to maintain a "Free hand"*

But the

deepest reason was that Britain considered the northern
coast of France as part of her "critical boundarys" and felt
she could not tolerate an unfriendly nation that close to
English shores*
On 31 July Grey appears to have decided that "England's
obligation of honor to France and her own material interests
made it imperative for her to intervene on the Franco-Russian
side"10^

With the mobilization of France and Germany on

1 August, the Cabinet met on 2 August, the "Sunday of Resolve"
and after deliberation committed the fleet to protection
of the French coast*

Two days later Britain declared war on

Germany as she moved through Belgium*
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Thus the issue was joined*

We have seen all the major

powers of Europe moved from a period of relative stability,
however uneasy, to open conflict which would prove to be the
most destructive ever seen of human life*

Running throughout

the intricate and complex patterns of events the basic under
lying causes remain visible, Militarism, the alliance systems,
and the characteristics of mobilization.
It was seen that the alliance systems that developed
and solidified during the early years of the 20th century
were to come to have an almost overpowering effect on all
statesmen and their ordering of priorities*

Time and again

actions were initiated or supported that were not, in fact, in
the best interest of peace or even that country's welfare*
Alliance cohesion became a prime mover of man and nation, and
a

reason in itself for actions that might otherwise have had

no chance of being executed.

The event of July 1914 showed

conclusively that this phenomenon had progressed to the point
that all initiatives of a given country were viewed positively
or negatively not on the basis of merit (as both the British
and Germans proposed plans that were, objectively, reasonable
solutions) but on the basis of which alliance had sponsored
it*

Initiatives were almost uniformly accepted by o n e ’s own

allies and dismissed out of hand by the opposing forces*
The alliances further acted to drastically increase
the sense of insecurity of member nations*

This was

83

particularly true of the Triple Alliance powers*

A mani

festation of its pervasiveness can be seen in the Kaiser's
marginalia days prior to the outbreak of war when he wrote
on 30 July 1914 that England and France were "waging a war
of extinction • • • England sneeringly reaps the brilliant
success of her persistantly prosecuted purely anti-German
world policies, against which we have proved ourselves vir
tually helplessV^*0^
From the sequence of events portrayed during the crisis
period itself, it would appear almost impossible to overstate
the importance of the mobilization process and its role in
precipitating the actual outbreak of hostilities*

Within

the conceptual framework it becomes possible to observe how
decision-makers would acutely sense time compression over a
series of actions that might take weeks to occur*

Certainly

the "automatic" nature of mobilization had a tremendous
effect on decision makers, both in sensing time inadequacy and
perception of threat*

No country could afford to allow its

opponent to gain any significant advantage in mobilizing
forces without permanently prejudicing its own fortunes*
July 1914 was an excellent example of the tendency
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discussed in the first chapter for decision units to perceive
their opponents as having progressively greater control over
the situation at hand, while they become less and less capable
of influencing events*

Communications played a significant

role in this process, the results of which were described with
force by Joachim Remak when he noted that "what appears in
print is likely to look neat and logical, in truth, more often
than not, was chaotic or at best improvised.

Decisions were

made with no time for proper reflection, messages crossed
each other, and some of the fateful errors were committed
from motives no more profound gr sinister than lack of infor
mation or sleep".*0®
It would appear from the information available here
that the three working hypotheses at least fail to be disconfirmed.

There is, to the contrary, evidence to suggest

they may hold true.

Numerous examples appear which cleaxly

relate the parallel perceptions of increasing threat and
saliency of time; the actions of all the General Staff *s
after Austria's ultimatum was given in the most immediate
and obvious example of this phenomenon.
In the diaries, memoranda, and official documents of
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all the major European powers statements appear indicating
the belief that a European war would be disastrous for every
one.

Yet, obviously, the immediate national and alliance needs

of July 1914 took precedence in determining priorities.

Immed

iate needs dominated to the point that nations which knew their
long range good lay in continued peace initiated a wax they
all agreed would bring disasterous consequences.
The willingness to consider alternatives is directly re
lated to the perceptual set of the two opposing alliances and
the

perceived adequacy of time.

It was here shown that the

range of alternatives presented and the time available were
directly correlated.

The continuum would run from Austria,

which was essentially in a state of high threat and short
time in the initial stage, making no suggestions and effective
ly working to thwart those presented, to Britain, which was
the most active and least involved initially and, in fact,
was last to enter the war.

Another facet of the time factor

was the influence on the technology available to transmit
these messages.

The sense of inadequacy was generally e n 

hanced by the nature of time it took to send and receive
messages and the continuous crossing of messages.

CHAPTER III
THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO INTERVENE:

KOREA 1950

It was early on that foggy Saturday in June 1950;
suddenly a distant role of thunder - was it rain?

It took

less than 30 seconds for the sleepy South Korean troops to
discover that the only rain falling was a deadly rain of
steel*

Before the dazed South Koreans could recover their

composure a vast force was overrunning positions all along
the front*

Grudgingly but surely the defenders began to

fall back before the weight of the North Korean Peoples
Liberation Army*s (KPLA) 7 Infantry Divisions and her
Armoured Brigade*
It is hard to tell during those first few hectic days
who was the more surprised - t h e soldier on the front or the
diplomat in the rear*

But one thing was clear - the war all

had feared and some predicted was here*

Before the two

forces were again on their respective sides of a demilit
arized zone, the United States would have backed up the
decisions made by its leaders during the last five days of
109
June 1950 with the lives of 33,629 men*
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The decision by President Truman to commit the United
States to the defense of South Korea is considered by many
authors to be one of the most important decisions of the 20th
Century*

j£ts impact was to be far reaching; it contributed

substantially to a containment policy in South East Asia, set
the course for US-Chinese relations that would last a genera
tion, and presented America with her first experience of a
frustrating, faction-building process known as limited war*
The purpose, then, of this chapter will be to look at
this event in history in light of the framework developed in
the first part of the paper*

In order to present data and

events in a manner most conducive to a clear conceptualiza
tion of the role of perceived threat and time compression,
the chapter has been organized using a combination of situa
tional and chronological ordering devices.
The first portion of the chapter will be a brief review
of the relevant events in South East Asia from 1945 to 1950.
This will be followed by sections which will develop the
national and international settings forming the immediate
perceptual environment of mid 1950.

With the ’’definition

of the situation” then developed, a detailed account of the
important events occurring from 25 June 1950 to 30 June 1950
will be presented to enable the reader to understand what
happened, and the role of the phenomenon under investigation

88
in the output of the Truman decision unit#

The final section

of the chapter will be to reflect on what was uncovered and
to suggest some possible conclusions to be drawn#
US AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 1945-1950:

It would not be over

stating the opinion of the period to say that United States
interest in Korea at the close of the Second World Wax was
minimal at best.

The initial division of Korea was an admin

istrative convenience established by the American military
forces to facilitate disarmament of residual Japanese units
on the Korean peninsula#

Believing the task of collecting

the items of war throughout the total of Korea to be beyond
the capability of the American units available for the task,
the US asked Russia to conduct the collection process north
of the 38th parallel#

This was the initial step in the well-

detailed road to the situation which manifested itself that
summer of 1950#
There is a point of some sophistication that is not so
well documented that needs to be addressed in understanding
the "why" of U#S# intervention into Korea.

The point in

question is the abrupt and dramatic change that occurred in
the balance which the United States had sought to achieve in
this part of the world.
Korea had boon seen as unimportant for a very simple
reason.

At that time it was expected by American strategic

planners that China would, under Generalisirao Chaing Kai Shek,
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become the bulwark of containment against Russian desires in
this part of the world.

Japan was to be kept emasculated and

a relative non-entity in the power equation of the region. In
such an environment Korea would easily be controlled and posed
no particular interest.
Obviously this scenario was never to come to pass. As
the writing on the wall became bigger and bolder the United
States was forced to reorient its efforts to develop a res
training force in South East Asia.
possibility was a revitalized Japan.

The only other reasonable
Slowly but surely the

realization of the strategic position of the Korean peninsula
in relation to the South China Sea, and as an invasion spring
board to Japan, began to make itself felt.

However, by the

summer of 1950 this idea was still very much formu1ative
(remembering the Peoples Republic of China did not exist u n 
til 1 October 1949).

A reflection of this ambiguous status

will appear later in the chapter in some of the statements
made by various statesmen.
Given the ambivalent attitude at this time and the
particularly vociferous attacks being made by senior Republi
cans in Congress about staying out of this part the world,
it is not without soira justification that the NKPLA had
determined that the United States would not contest a fait

90
accompli by the North Koreans*

Unquestionably the North

Koreans must have been as flabbergasted on the 30th of June
as was President Truman on the 25th.
This then was the “macro11 environment which encompassed
the specifics of the immediate internal and external settings
as they existed in 1950.

It remains for us now to complete

the decision units perceptual set by discussing these two
settings®
INTERNAL SETTING:

The internal setting involves, at

a minimum, two inter-related and inter-acting forces,

1)

prominent, or key personalities, and 2) the domestic politi
cal situation.

The importance of either of these can, and

will, differ drastically depending on the time, nation, and
personalities involved.

In the case of Korea the dynamics

of two personalities were to prove to be the dominant, which
is not to say the sufficient, factors in the direction and
form of the decisions of 25-30 June 1950.

Because of the

prominence of Fresidant Truman and Secretary of State Acheson
in these proceedings, it is appropriate to taka a moment to
briefly sketch the personality traits of revelance to their
crisis dacision-making*
President Truman could have personified the American
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national experience after 1945 when he described becoming
President as having been nsuddenly catapulted into the midst
of world-shaking episodes”.111

He conceptualised the role

of himself as President as filling the people's desire for a
strong President, champion of the common man, with a
historic mission to be ready to make decisions*

112

The President had a penchant for equating problems he
faced with historical precedents*

For Truman, "todays prob

lems are largely yesterdays implications • • • he held that
for almost all present problems there were precedents that
113
would provide clear guides to the right principles of action"*
In addition to history, a characteristic feature of President
Truman's pattern of decision-making was the way he sought to
base decisions upon group deliberation among his advisors*
Paige noted, "When faced with a major occasion for decision,
the President's customary practice was to gather his principle
advisors, to state or have someone state the matter for
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decision, to elicit individual expression of opinion, to en
courage further discussion for the clarification of issues,
and then to decide or to delay decision”*

114

In a great many respects, the views of Acheson and the
President were almost one and the same*

This was particular

ly true of the perceived roles of the Secretary of State and
of the President*

Acheson saw the proper role for the

Secretary of State as that of the ”first minister” and
115
”senior member of the cabi.net”*
Acheson felt that he
should be the principal, unifying, and final source of recom
mendations to the President on foreign policy*

Acheson's

style of leadership and organization to produce recommenda
tions was very similar to that stated above for the President*
Thus Secretary Acheson expressed skepticism of the "too
facile and pat”, shunned the idea that American foreign
policy could be based on readings taken from a piece of moral
116
”litmus paper”*
Now that a brief look at the two dominant personalities
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involved has been made, it remains to build around them the
domestic political situation.

When the occasion for decision

in Korea was abruptly thrust upon them, the President,
Secretary of State, and other Administration leaders were
caught up in a complex network of reciprocal influences and
expectations that characterize executive - legislative re
lations.

This relationship was in a particularly sensitive

state because this was a midterm election year and the subtle
linkages between political leadership and public opinion were
at the forefront.
Two issues of the day brought sharp partisan conflict
and growing bitterness in Congress.

These issues were the

Administration^ policies towards Nationalist China and the
claim that the State Department was infiltrated by communists.
The split on these issues was particularly bitter and caused
the disintergration of what had been a bipartisan effort in
international affairs.

The 80th Congress had had agreement

among 82% of the Republicans and 92% of the Democrats on
117
foreign aid bills.
This schism started a period of acrimony between the parties and also split the Republican Party
over Senator McCarthy*s tactics.
In June of 1950 the relations between the Administra-
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tion and the Congress were characterized by a complex set of
conflicting supportive, and avoidant relations*

The President,

Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense were all under
critical attack: the President for his over-all leadership,
Secretary Acheson for his China policy (of non-involvement on
C h i n a ’s civil war) and for harboring subversives, and Defense
Secretary Johnson for sacrificing military needs for budget
compression*

118

It obviously takes no great perceptive faculties to
see that the internal setting for the coming crisis was some
thing less than ideal, but this only provides one aspect of
the situational set*

The other part is the external setting.

By June of 1950 the United States policy makers had
generally coza to view the world as bi-polar.

One camp was

seen as a combination of Russian national power, universal
revolutionary ideology, and an international political move
ment.

The other camp was seen as a coalition, centered on

American power, of nations determined to escape communist
119
dominat ion.
From presidential speeches made during the spring of
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1950, an observer could note the international situation
being described as one in which the United States of America
stood as the leader of an international moral crusade against
an evil and aggressive foe*

For the President, Communism was

an offensive designed to "penetrate, divide, confuse, and
subvert free peoples"•

120

In order to cope with the inter

national environment the President called for two main cour
ses of action; "First, we cannot compromise our own moral
12

and ethical beliefs, and second we cannot isolate ourselves"*

Thus the President summoned the American people to demonstrate
the moral and material superiority of the free world over
Communism*
Words and ideas such as those above undoubtedly had
little or no influence on the men in the Kremlin who heard
them*

Used to the polemics of their own orbit, these state

ments were surely given no weight*

With the reader's 20-20

hindsight it can be seen that here was a man who meant ex
actly what he said*

Any sudden violent action that changed

the status quo was almost certain to be seen as unacceptable*
However, the President was not the only voice speaking
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out, Secretary Ache son, a believer in Real Politik* saw as
the central task of American diplomacy in the post-war era
the creation of a balance of power such that the Soviet lea
ders could be brought to a general live-and-let-live policy*
In working towards this policy Acheson attempted to
limit the area of American interest in South Bast Asia* One
of the oft-quoted pronouncements on this area of interest,
or "defense perimeter", as it was referred to, was from a
speech on January 12, 1950, when he stated, "This defensive
perimeter runs along the Aluetians to Japan and then goes to
the Ryukus Islands • • • from the Ryukus to the Phi lip ine
Islands * • • So far as the military security of other areas
in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person
can guarantee these against military attack * * * Should such
an attack occur • • • the initial reliance must be on the
people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitment
~

of the entire civilized world * *

122

This view was a combination of beliefs that the United
States could not protect everything whilst at the same time
fearing that any place that the free world showed weakness,
a political vacuum would be created into which the Soviets
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would flow*

Events on the International scene since 1945

had caused the American decision unit to see international
affairs as essentially dichotomous, threatening, and re
quiring the application of counter-veiling force*

Me*

Truman had first developed this impression during the Pots
dam conferences when he noted to the then Secretary of De
fense Byrnes on January 5, 1945, ,fanother war is in the
making*

Only one language do they understand - 'how many
123
divisions have you'?”
This view was reinforced in three
areas of confrontation that were to occur in the 1945-50
era:

these were Iran (1946), Greece (1947-48), and Berlin

(1949)*

These confrontations were viewed as successful

contests of strength and will*
Two events were to cause the United States to begin to
feel a change in the international power balance*

With the

explosion of an Atomic bomb by the Soviet Union and the
emergence of Communist China in late 1949, it gradually be
came obvious that some of the previous assumptions on which
the old balance was predicated were no longer valid*

As a

consequence the President reacted on 30 January 1950 to a
lowered sense of security by asking for a major policy
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reappraisal by State and Defense Departments •

The study was

done between February and April of 1950 and then submitted
to the President*

The President then gave it to the National

Security Council for study (later known as NSC 68)*

The

National Security Council was in the process of cost analysis
when the war broke out, but was understood to have recommended
a greatly increased military budget and improvement of conventional forces*

124

As a potential source of trouble, Korea was included
in NSC-68 along with Finland, Berlin,

Iceland, and Yugoslavia*

Yet the predominant opinion of the intelligence community
during the spring of 1950 was that there would be little
chance of an all-out invasion of South Korea*
SATURDAY, JUNE 24th:

Although some writers such as

I* F* Stone have attempted to build a case that the attack
by the North Koreans was either encouraged or instigated by
the South Koreans and Americans, there is an overwhelming
body of information which shows conclusively that the attack
was a complete surprise*

This needs to be qualified by say

ing that US intelligence agencies were aware of North Korea's
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aggressive posture as early as in March*

However the Supreme

Command Allied Powers (SCAP) evaluated the reports as doubt ful*

The Pentagon agreed with this evaluation and anticipated

only guerrila action*

As late as 18 June 1950, the Chairman

of the Joint Chief’s of Staff (JCS) and Secretary of Defense
were briefed at SCAP headquarters and given no indication of
125
a pending North Korean attack*
So, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, it
was a tremendous surprise to both the soldiers and diplomats
when the NKPLA struck at 0400 hours 24 June 1950*

John E*

James, a UP I correspondent, gave the world its first news of
the Korean war; his telegram reached the US early on the 25th
(the reader should keep in mind the date/time change between
Korea and the United States) which stated: ”250925 JAMBS
FRAGMENTARY RPTS . . . INDICATED NORTH KOREANS LAUNCHED
SUNDAY MORNING ATTACKS GENERALLY ALONG ENTIRE BORDER”.126
Some two hours later the first official notice was received
from Ambassador Muccio, and stated in part, "According to
Korean Army reports • • • North Korean forces invaded
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Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning •
. . It would appear from the nature of the attack and the
manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out
offensive against the Republic of Korea"•

127

A small group of officials hurriedly met at the State
Department at approximately 2230 hours.

After conferring

together,Dean Rusk(Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs), John
Hickerson (Secretary for UN Affairs) and Frank Pace (Secretary
of the Army) called Ache son at his farm at 2245 hours recom
mending immediate notification of the UN of what had happened
and requesting an emergency meeting.

Acheson agreed to these

measures and then called the President, who was at his home
in Missouri at 2320 hours to inform him.

Acheson advised

the President not to return immediately as the situation was
still too uncertain.
The information from the fighting front was fragmentary;
neither the ultimate intentions of the attackers nor the extent of their immediate gains were clear.
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The general

feeling at the time was that the Republic of Korea Army
(ROXA) could hold its ovm against an attack by the North
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unless active support was being given by the Soviets*

If the

invasion was serious, they had no doubts but that it was a
129
Soviet directed operation*
The first day was here and gone, as Glenn Paige indic
ates, "The officials shared a strong sense of the emergency
of the situation - the need to do something and do it without
1

delay*

The North Korean invasion had caught them by surprise'^

So it had*

Compounding the sense of threat inherent in the

attack was the tremendous distance between the officials res
ponsible for making these decisions and the events them
selves*

Certainly no small amount of anxiety was added by

the fact that it was discovered that there was no position
paper prepared on Korea for policy guidance*

All contingency

plans developed had been built on the assumption of a general
conflagration, in which case Korea was to be left to fend for
herself*
SUNDAY JUNE 25:

On arriving at the State Department,

Acheson received signs of a worsening situation - Muccio was
evacuating all US dependents and non-combatants, and President
Rhee was moving his capitol South to Suwan0

Reports were
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coming in that indicated the South Koreans were disintegrat
ing*

In view of events Acheson decided to call Truman and

recommend that he return to Washington D* C*

The sense of

compressed time already felt by the President was indicated
in this telephonic conversation, as he told the Secretary of
State that "some decision would have to be made at once as
to the degree of aid or encouragement which our government
131
was willing to extend to the Republic of Korea"*
On the plane returning from Independence, the President
reflected on historical precedents and noted that "the North
Korean attack was the same in nature as the German, Italian
and Japanese aggression that had led to World War II* * •
if the Communist leaders were appeased, then gradually the
scale of violence and the number of participating states
would increase to global dimensions ••• considered it right
to resist promptly and effectively the North Korean aggression”*

132

The President then made crystal clear the sense of

threat he perceived in the situation*
the NKPLA but Communism as a whole*

The opponent was not
The attack becomes

critical to American values not because of South Korea, but
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because of the implication it had for spreading into areas
of truly central importance to the American people*
The President axrived in Washington D*C* at 1920 hours
and went immediately to the Blair House where a group of 13
selected advisors were waiting on him*

There were representa

tives from State (Acheson, Rusk, Webb, Hickerson, Jessup),
from Defense (Johnson, Pace, Matthews, Pinletter) and from
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley, Collins, Sherman, Vanderburg)*
The President opened the meeting by encouraging dis
cussion and having Acheson recap the last 24 hours*

Secretary

Acheson then advanced 5 proposals worked out by his staff for
133
discussion* These were:
1*

SCAP furnish ROKA additional military equipment*

2*

US warplanes cover the withdrawal of American

dependent s *
3*

US warplanes be authorized to destroy KPLA tanks

and planes that attempt to disrupt the evacuation*
4*

Consideration be given to further aid in support

of the UN resolution calling for a North Korean withdrawal*
5*

7th Fleet neutralize the Formosan Straights*

By the end of the discussion all had been approved except #5,
which the President decided to "sleep on"*
133
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The general opinion that developed out of this first
meeting contributed to later perception of time compression
by the dual tendency to accept fragmentary reports of limited
ROKA counter-attacks as a sign of their ability to hold the
NKPLA, and a parallel tendency to underestimate the capabili
ties of the N0rth Koreans*

Thus the consensus of the

President and his advisors, based on the general trend and
earlier calculations, was that the South Koreans could
probably contain the attack unless the North Koreans had re
ceived extensive assistance*

The invasion was seen as a

Soviet Grand Strategic move with many possible ramifications;
primarily as a threat to Japanese security and to the
collective security program built by the US*

134

The situation at this first meeting was not seen as a
question of whether to intervene or not*

However, as each

advisor gave his opinion it became obvious that a kind of
unspoken agreement existed that " * • • Whatever had to be
done to meet this aggression had to be done*

There was no

13!
suggestion * * * that * * * the US could back away from it”*
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The conference ended with a general sense of resolve
among all present.

The agreed upon recommendations then

were passed telephonically to MacArthur•

Jessup was later

to maintain that "on the basis of this conference the USunder the banner of the U.N. - was prepared to accept the
catastrophy of World Wax III if it proved to be unavoidable
because of American refusal to accept the intolerable evils
of appeasement" •
MONDAY, 26 JUNE:

Word that Kim II Sung had rejected

out of hand the U.N. proposal at 2030 hours on the evening
before set the tone for possibly the most critical day of
the Korean crisis.

By mid-afternoon the prospects for

survival of the Republic of Korea were diminishing at a
rapid rate.

Late in the afternoon SCAP sent a situation

report painting a grim picture of events:

"Piecemeal entry

into action vie, Seoul , • , not successful in stopping the
penetration • • • tanks entering suburbs of Seoul • • ,
South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern
offensive • , « our estimate is that a complete collapse is
137
imminent","
The implications of this message are obvious
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the threat was much more serious than originally estimated
and the

time to deal with

it was

somewhat less.Upon hear

ing the

report, President

Truman

had Acheson setup a second

meeting for 2100 hours with the same group that had met the
previous evening, stating that the situation was so threaten
ing as to require it.
The meeting followed the same format as the previous
night.

Agreement existed

at the

onset among the conferees

that if

the United States

did not come to the aid of South

Korea within the next several hours there might be no further
decisions to be made concerning the preservation of the Korean
Republic,

138

Secretary Acheson made a series of proposals

which he and his staff had worked out that day.
1,

139
These were:

Navy and Air Force should be instructed to give

"fullest possible support" south of the 38th parallel.
2,

Orders be issued to cause the 7th Fleet to prevent

either China from attacking the other,
3,

Military forces (U,S.) in the Phillipines be

strengthened and increased military assistance be provided
to the Phillipine government.

That military assistance be

138
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accelerated to Vietnam and a MAG (Military Advisory Group)
be sent there•
With minimal discussion the recommendations were approved as
presented.

It can be seen by the contents that ground inter

vention was still not contemplated.

However the really

critical point was that the US had indicated its intention
to commit American combat power.
The conferees and the President drew historical para
llels between the present situation and Axis powers in World
War II, much as Truman had done on the plane two days earlier.
The President and his advisors reached agreement that a
failure of the United States to save ROK would be intolerable.
They calculated that with every blow to ROK that went u n 
answered, the reputation and prestige of America sank lower
and lower.

The viability of collective security was also

perceived to be in jeopardy.

Thus while the loss of Korea

as a piece of real estate would not have meant a direct threat
to American military security, the President and his advisors
perceived a logical progression which would inevitably
140
menace the safety of the United States,
This idea was
summed up by Secretary of State Ache son when he noted that
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the North Korean action • • • "was a challenge to the whole
system of collective security not only in the Far East but
everywhere in the world.

It was a threat that all nations

would be intimidated by this show of force".
The decision to meet force with force in Korea was
essential.

It was the unanimous view of the political and

military advisors of the President that this was the right
thing to do".

141

With the closing of this meeting, the

United States had taken its first gigantic step into the
Korean War.
battle.

Air and Naval forces would new be committed to

The decisions reached at the Blair House were

announced the next day (27th).
TUESDAY, 27 JUNE:
ty germane to this study.

This was a day of no great activi
Efforts centered around UN

activities and attempts to get Russia to stop the North
Koreans.

On the home front, the President entertained a

delegation from Congress and received support from Dewey,
the titular head of the Republican party.
WEDNESDAY, 28 JUNE:

Throughout this period the

President was having all concerned departments do restudies
and ro-evaluations of potential results of the Korean action
on areas of concern on the Soviet periphery.

The President

141
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and his advisors did not make any new decision on this day
but scanned all incoming information for indicators of a
Soviet response to the request to stop the North Koreans.
THURSDAY, 29 JUNE:

The situation was to climax on this

day, with word of Seoulfs fall the day before and reports
coming in from SCAP indicating imminent disaster.

A 0700

report from SCAP estimated ROKA casualties of about 50% and
stated that it was questionable whether ROKA forces could
hold the Han River line.

142

As the report was followed by

m o r e of a similar nature it became obvious to all that the
air and naval power would not do the job.

With the situa

tion becoming continuously less stable the Secretary of
Defense called the President and arranged a meeting at 1700
that night.
The same basic group that had attended previously was
on hand with the addition of Symington of the National
Security Resources B 0ard and Ley of the NSC staff •

The

meeting centered around Secretary of Defense Johnson who
gave a presentation on the main difficulties hampering
military action in Korea.

He then made a series of recom

mendations with the major one being to put service and combat

142
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troops into Pusan*

The President was uneasy about US troops

being commited, but Acheson showed him the Soviet response
to a query made to Russia on the 27th asking the Soviets to
call off the NKPLA*

The note indicated that it would do no

thing to stop the North Koreans but also that they would not
intervene in Korea against U.S. troops*

This information

opened the way for the eventual entry of large scale American
ground troops*

143

The meeting lasted only 40 minutes and produced two
directives:

144

1) restrictions on aircraft to stay below

the 38th parallel were lifted, and 2) service and combat troops
were authorized to be dispatched to Pusan to secure the
embarkation facility*

As the President’s advisors left the

White House they were unaware that North Korean tanks had
already broken through the Han River line and were pushing
reminants of ROK units before them.
The meeting on the 29th, as with the two earlier ones,
demonstrated by comments of the participants and actions
taken that the situation was perceived as a significant
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threat to vital US national interests.

The definite des

truction of the idea that the ROK forces could handle the
situation by the 29th and the increasing rate of collapse
acted to continuously raise the sense of time compression.
The less the myth of ROK ability to handle the invasion was
believed, the more urgent became the perceived requirement
for immediate decisive action.
FRIDAY, 30 JUNE:

At approximately 0400 hours an

urgent telegram arrived belatedly from SCAP headquarters
stating the results of MacArthur *s personal visit of 28 June.
The message said in part: "On 30 June 1950 CINCFE informs
the J C S 9 after a recon of the Korean battle area, that the
Korean Army was in total confusion . . .

the most the South

Korean Army could hope to accomplish would be to retard the
advance of the enemy.

The South K0rean Army was incapable

of united action . . .

the only assurance . . .

to regain

lost ground would be through the commitment of US ground
combat forces” .

145

MacArthur recommended one Regimental

Combat Team (RCT) and two Divisions to follow as the forces
to be sent.

The massage was passed on with the urging from

SCAP that "time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision

145
Military Situation in the Far Bant - Hearings
before the Axrred Services and Foreign Affairs Committees,
US Senate 82nd Congress, Part II, 1012.

112
without delay is essential” •
After a conference between members of the JCS, Secre
tary Pace (Array) was informed of the report.

He in turn

called the President who immediately approved the release of
the RCT but withheld decision on the two divisions.

The

last of the major meetings was set up for 0930 hours at the
White House.

146

The meeting was to last but 30 minutes and centered
around the determination of the adequacy of two divisions.
With virtual unanimous approval it was decided that SCAP
would be authorized to send in the two divisions and was
147
given ”full authority to use troops under his command”.
With this done, the meeting ended and the Pentagon
officials left to begin the massive preparations required.
President Truman addressed a Boy Scount convention and went
for a cruise on the Presidential yacht.

So ended the week

that was.
CONCLUSIONS: According to David Reese in his
excellent book Korea:

The Limited War, the decisions made
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148
between 25-30 June had many roots*

Among these are:

1*

The desire to uphold law in international life*

2*

The desire to uphold collective security*

3*

The contest of will between east and west*

4*

Korea was seen as "another anschluss".

5*

It was seen as the application of the US policy

of containment*
6*

The defense of Korea would bolster NATO is that

belief that the US would defend them if necessary*
7*

Complex "Pacific considerations" centered around

the Japanese industrial base.
This author would posit that these explanations for action
track vary wall with the evidence here presented to demon
strate the sense of perceived threat and its raising during
the period in question.
Central to the validity of the observation is the
realization that the threat perceived was only symbolically
connected with the physical entity called the Republic of
Korea.

A brief reflection on tha external setting for this

decision unit causes the reader to see that this threat was
very real indeed from the point of view of the participants.
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The fact that the level of perceived threat rose during this
6 day period was demonstrated both in the comments provided
and in the actions these decision elites executed*

Moving

from cautious, non-committal responses on the 24th to the
commitment of two full divisions on the 30th*
The sense of time compression is equally shown, moving
from the initial belief that ROKA units would stop the
attack on the 24th and 25th to the plea of MacArthur on the
29th for "a decision without delay” if South Korea is to be
held*

The sense of urgency displayed by the participants

became progressively greater as the week advanced culminating
in decisions being made telephonically in the early morning
hours, and instructions to SCAP being sent by voice instead
of cable*
Additionally a reasonable case can be made for the
proposition that the speed of decision-making was artificially
rapid, and the best example in itself of the effects of per
ceived time saliency*

The course of events following Truman1s

decision shows no overwhelming objective requirement demand
ing action by the 30th of June*

The American Far East

Command was able to have a 560 man force (Task Force South)
in Korea within 24 hours of the President1s decision to
commit ground troops*

Yet the North Korean's, even with

minimal American resistance, were unable to reach and invest
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the Pusan perimeter until 4 August-some five weeks later*
The fact that more time was objectively available is
also substantiated by the fact that the US divisions which
participated in the perimeter defense arrived between the
6th of July (the 24th Infantry Division) and the 18th of
July,

(1st Cavalry Division)*

At a minimum at least one

additional week was available for the consideration of op
tions and strategies*

That the D M unit did not perceive

this is directly attributable to the effects of crisis
situations as described in chapter one*
As indicated in the description of the sequence of
events, the sense of time given in the initial stage was
such that the decision group really never discussed any
alternatives whatsoever.

The pressure to produce direc

tions, and not having a policy paper on this situation avail
able, worked to limit the decision unit to a narrowed focus,
with progressive refinements of the initial policy direc
tion being considered rather than a discussion of other real
alternat ivas *
The fact that President Truman and his advisors focused
on the immediate needs goes almost without saying. Prior to
the crisis period, virtually all written evidence of the
importance of Korea in America's long range plans indicated
at bast a secondary importance.

The area was not even
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considered important enough to seriously contest Congress'
defeat of the Korean supplementary military aid bill in
late 1949*

Had anyone during this time stated to the

President that some six months later that he would take
actions which would commit us to support of Vietnam, cause
a 20 year estrangement between the US and China, intensify
US-Russian enmity, and provide the major cause for loss of
the White House to the Democratic Party, and all of this to
protect South Korea, it is highly unlikely that he would
have been greeted as a sage*
It would appear then, that, in the case of the Korean
crisis that the working hypotheses have failed to be disconfirmed.

CHAPTER IV
THE RELUCTANT DRAGON:

CHINA

INTERVENES

On or about 16 October 1950 the lead elements of Lin
Piao's Fourth Field Army crossed the Sino-Korean border
and occupied the area immediately adjacent to the Peoples
Republic of China*

With this act China embarked on a

course of action that was to profoundly affect how the
Chinese leaders subsequently evaluated the role of China
in Asia, the nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and EastWest relations*
In this chapter it is the intention of the author to
explore the role of perceived threat and compressed time in
the decision-making process of the collective Chinese
leadership which led to this commitment of 16 October 1950*
In so doing, the paper will attempt to depict the pattern
of continually increasing perceptions of threat and in
adequacy of time felt by China's leaders, which eventually
culminated in China's entrance into the Korean war.

It

will be shown that the reasons for deciding to engage the
United Nations Forces ware markedly different than those
the West normally assumes*

In stark contrast to the

bombastic, aggressive image that immediately comes to mind
117

when thinking of Red China during this time, the reader will
see here a very different picture*

What emerges is a purpose

fully cautious and flexible young nation, not at all a nxi o u s .
to become engaged in mortal combat with the "paper tiger” of
the West*
This chapter has been broken into three main sections;
first is a brief look at the factors influencing Chinese
decision-makers; second is a detailed consideration of their
actions in relation to perceived threat between 25 June and
16 October 1951; and the final section draws some conclusions
as to the likely relationship between the perception of time
and threat and Chinese action during this period*
Two final conrrtents need to be made in the way of e s 
tablishing the framework used*

First is that the focus of

this chapter is on the Chinese perceptions, and so will not
deal with the reaction or interaction of the Soviet or
American government in any detail*

Secondly, the author is

dealing with a closed society, consequently direct informa
tion is frequently not available on the thoughts, perceptions
and actions of key decision makers*

Hence the conclusions

drawn are, by necessity, more heavily reliant on the logical
implications of data presented than was necessary in the
other crises observed for this survey*
It is characteristic of this approach that it is not
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considered essential to know the specific thoughts of any one
member of the decision unit being observed*

It is a basic

assumption here that the perception of these individuals can
be determined with a high degree of certitude by observing
what was said and dons by ths group as a whole at various times,
in the form of communications and actions*
THE CHINESE FRAME OF REFERENCE:

As mentioned in the

first chapter, culture and the particular perceptual set of
any group of decision-makers is a tremendously significant
factor in analyzing events.

It is for this reason that before

looking at the events of June-October 1950 it is appropriate
to develop, at least in broad terms, the particular perspec
tive of the Chinese leadership.

Certainly no decision is

ever made solely on the basis of the singular situation in
which a parson is involved.

Decision-makers, like others,

form their evaluations and proposed actions on the basis of
many factors, only one of which is the situation at hand.
In this section, an effort will be made to identify and dis
cuss soma of the more important factors that make up the
decision-making "anatomy” of the senior Chinese decisionmaJRing nxoup#
There appears to be considerable evidence to support
the opinion that, given the chance, the new leaders of China
would have preferred an extended period of international
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tranquility.

The policy orientation with which Mao and his

associates approached the Korean war was heavily influenced
by internal considerations.

With the Peoples Republic of

China (PRC) in existance only since October 1, 1949, the
focus of attention was most naturally towards internal
matters.

Of particular importance were the steps taken for

political unity and towards a planned economy.

It must be

remembered that at this time a significant anti-communist
element was still active in China.

In comparison with this

desired period of introspection, the Korean war imposed a
most unwelcome problem.

This problem was to force the

Chinese to divert their time, manpower, and resources away
from internal development.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership brought
three pertinent frames of reference to their analysis of the
events of mid 1950.

These were the Chinese, ideological and

experimental or experience components.

149

The Chinese component of the frame of reference was a
combination of factors from China*s sense of destiny and
"rightful" place in the world as the middle kingdom.

Two

characteristics of this class of perceptions are the concern
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with China*s borders and a xenophobic fear or foreign devils,
or barbarians.

China has long shown great sensitivity over

her border regions with desires manifest in various ways to
expand to control strategic points.

Maps even today show
150
borders to the south as "still to be determined".
All of
these signs are consistent with the notion that China was
attempting to establish her critical boundaries at some dis
tance beyond the legal boundaries.

The advance of U N forces

up the Korean penninsula was to force Communist China to
define, and eventually defend, this limit.

It is of interest

to note that this "Chinese" component was not singular to
the PRC leadership.

Prior to being ejected from the mainland,

Chaing Kai Shek had indicated on several different occasions
that he considered Tibet to still be a part of, and properly
under control of, the government of China.

These statements

and others in reference to C h i n a ’s southern borders track
completely with statements issued by the CCP.
The second major segment is that of ideology.

Ideology

tends to interact with the Chinese component and has caused
a modification to both factors.

It has enhanced the ex

pansionist e1crant of the Chinese factor through the messi
anic mission to spread the "true word" of communism.
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modification of sorts was made in changing to a selective
application of the "foreign devil" label to include only those
countries outside the socialist camp, in particular the
United States.

Abandoned was the traditional value placed on

compromise, and din its place came the communist tenet that
conflict is inevitable; the capitalist system will continue
t o try to destroy the communist countries.

As early as 1926

Mao was echoing Lenin's doctrine of mutually antagonistic
camps:

"The present world situation is one in which the two

big forces, revolution and counter-revolution are engaged
in a final struggle . . .

..

independent"•

there is no room for any to remain

151

The ideological component provided the following assumptions in Peking's policy formulations in June of 1950:
a.

The world is divided into two hostile camps.

b.

Neutrality is a camouflage for members of the

152

capitalist camp.
c.

Alliance with the socialist camp is necessary for

success of the revolution in China and China's survival.
d.

Alliance with the socialist camp is necessary to

promote revolution throughout the world.
e.
151
152

Final victory inevitably belongs to communism.

Mao Tse Tung, "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society"
in Selected Works
(New York, 1954) 14-15.
Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu
(New York, 1960) 9.
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The final component to be considered is the experimen
tal or experience element#

Of tremendous impact in this

category is the fact that China depended totally on the Soviet
Union for all information and analysis of the world outside
her own borders#

Throughout World War II, and continuing up

t o the period considered, TASS provided all information used
b y the Chinese/communist elites, with the probable exception
153
of Chou En Lai#
This sole dependency on TASS was a result of the PRC's
inherent distrust of all "foreign devils" (with the except
ion of Moscow), a tendency to look strictly to internal
sources cf information and reinforcement, and a growing belief
in their own propaganda#

Much of the news received from

other sources (American Liason Officers, BBC, etc#), clashed
directly with basic assumptions of the C C P ’s decision unit
and was avoided or ignored because of it#

As a consequence

of this highly selective filtering of information, events
occurring outside China were made to coincide with the
revolutionary experience and ideological dogma that was so
vital to Chinese leadership.
This restriction of views reinforced the tendency to
v i e w the world through a strict communist ideological lens.
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* 24 *;

This filtering process explains such gross misjudgements of
the world around the Chinese leadership as these excerpts
indicate . • •
1936-"The Japanese (proletarian) revolution is not
154
only a possibility but a certainty".
1947-"American economic crisis will arrive this year
or next • • . In the future the possibility exists of
America

inciting aggressive war against other capitalistic

countries".
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This remarkably narrow vision of the world around them
makes the Chinese even more susceptable to the "spiral of
effect" phenomenon.

A case in point was the rough handling

of US diplomats in Mukden during the civil war, and sub
sequent statements by Mao which created a public atmosphere
in America in which it was difficult to recognize the PRC.
Mao then, in turn, took this refusal as proof of America's
hostility to the PRC.
It can be seen, then, that the experimental segment
of the Chinese leaders' outlook affected them in several
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ways.

Most important of these were the use of Soviet

"glasses” to view the world; the selective contact with the
outside world which reinforced their dogmas and their
ideologically dominated picture of reality; and pre-concep
tions of the world which caused others to react in such a
way as to reinforce these dogmas.
Although the factors elaborated above provide the core
values and conceptions by which the actions of raid 1951 were
evaluated, the economic and political situation were certain
ly vital factors.

In the wake of the civil war Mao found

China facing a grain shortage of major proportions, declining
production and continued high military expenditures.

To

counter these problems, Mao ordered a partial demobilization
of the Peoples Liberation Armj (?LA) and return of the units
to their home bases to assist in agricultural and construction
work.

The northeast (Manchuria) area was especially import

ant to the Chinese industrial effort as indicated in the
following excerpt from Peonies China: "Northeast China holds
the key to industrialization of all China . . .

the rest of

China looks to Manchuria for the bulk of machinery, steel,
and other industrial goods needed to mechanize production”.
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With the efforts being made, China hoped for increases in the
production of rice, machine tools, iron and steel.
Qn the political scene, far and away the predominant
consideration was the need to eliminate many groups still
remaining within the Chinese society that were strongly anti
communist.

These groups ran the gamut from segments of KMT

units marauding the countryside to depossessed landlords.
At this point in time the need to consolidate and organize
received the lion's share of attention.

In dealing with

other nations, China's dogmatic insistance on non-recognition
of any state which maintained relations with Taiwan, and with
capitalistic countries in general, drove the PRC further into
isolation and significantly affected the attitudes of the
CCP leadership.
Increasing criticism from the international community
on the CPR's actions further reinforced China's dependency
on the Soviet Union.

This dependency was formalized with

Mao's visit to Moscow on 16 December 1949.

The result of

this visit was a mutual defense pact which stated in part:
"In tha event of one of the High Contracting Parties baing
attacked by Japan or one of the states allied with it, and
thus baing involved in a state of war, the other High
Contracting Party v/ill immediate iy render military and other
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assistance with all the means at their disposal’1.
impact of this agreement cannot be overstated.

The

Subsequent

Chinese actions in the international sphere were based in no
small measure on the assurance of the Soviet Union's military
support•
Another facet of China's international policy was the
considerable alarm which she showed towards the United States'
changing stand on Japan's role in Asia.

The PRC strongly

feared a resurgent Japanese nation, with military bases maintained b y the US.
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The possibility of North Korean control

of the whole peninsula was favored, in great measure, because
of the shield it would provide to the northeast sector of
the country from the traditional invasion route used by the
Japanese in the past.
As a final point in setting the stage, it appears from
what little information is available, that during this pre
war period China played no active role in North Korea or her
invasion plans, and indeed did not even have an ambassador
in the country until August of 1950.

It is likely that
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Peking was not even aware of the planned invasion until
M a o ’s visit to Moscow the previous December.
Now that the perceptual set has been established for
the CCP leadership and the major situation influences
identified, the events from 25 June to 16 October can be
profitably surveyed.
THE WAR FROM JUNE T O AUGUST 1950-CHINA’S VIEW:

The sun had

not yet risen that first Sunday morning when the initial
rounds of the communist artillery preparation came crashing
down on South Korean border positions.

At 4:00 am on 25

June the Korean Peoples Liberation Army (KPLA) launched a
coordinated attack against the South Korean forces all along
the military demarcation line.

It is clear from information

now available that the Soviet Union, China and North Korea
all expected the battle for South Korea to be easily won by
the North Korean forces under the guidance of their Soviet
advisors.

However, the events of the first phase of the

war were to force the communist planners to rethink their
basic expectations.
It can be fairly said that Peking probably expected a
swift victory by the KPLA which was to be followed up by a
Communist Chinese invasion of Taiwan*
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Events of 27 June
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in which Washington declared the 7th fleet would neutralize
the Formosan Straight changed the situation entirely.

Al

though the United States action was taken as a precautionary
measure, it could not help but be viewed as hostile by the
CPR leadership; they new were faced with few policy choices
in light of their previously stated desire to invade Taiwan and all of them ware bad.

The choices ran between carrying

out the attack with attendant risks, "delaying11 the invasion
and switching to a propaganda attack.
chosen as the least dangerous.

The latter course was

Thus America

established

herself in a hostile way, by the unprovoked, unwarranted
(from Peking's point of view) hostile acts.

The first input

to the spiral of effect has been made.
Chinese concern (Taiwan to the contrary) during the
period 27 June to 30 July was not intense, and this could be
seen in the Chinese press treatment given the war.

Initial

reports of the war appeared belatedly and in secondary
portions of the papers.

Warnings, when they appeared, about

possible American entry/involvement, were cautious.

Commen

tary uniformly asserted the certainty of North Korean
victory and made no specific commitment to the KPLA of any
thing other than moral support.

This period can be character

ized as one of the watchful waiting with the main effort
coming from Moscow.

Chinese interest continued to be
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primarily with its many internal problems and with Taiwan.
What reporting that was done on the war to the South was
noticably short on bombastic descriptive terms.

A combina

tion of confidence and caution was shown, concurrent with
reporting the KPLA advances, the mobilization efforts of the
United States forces in Japan, Hawaii and Okinawa were also
reported.

160

27 July saw a significant, if subtle, change in the
attitude of Peking.

In an article for World Culture a

phrase was used that had special significance to Chinese
readers.

It referred to "A prolonged wax of attrition will
161
naturally increase the difficulties of the Korean peoples..

Depicting North Korean fortunes in such terminology gives
strong indications of serious consideration being given at
higher echelons in the CCP of eventual stalemate and even
possible defeat.
During this same period (mid-May to July) some 60,000
soldiers of Lin Piao’s crack Fourth Field Army moved to with
in one month’s march by foot of the Korean front lines.
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likelihood is, though, that this move was only in part
motivated by the war itself.

More prominent was probably

Mao's decision on utilization of the Army for economic
mobilization.

Throughout the period 25 June - 30 July all

indicators were that the perceived threat to China was
minimal, and her corresponding involvement was the same.
The beginning of August saw the North Korean Army
close on the Pusan perimeter and a change in tactics by the
Soviets (who pulled the Chinese with them as acquiescent
but relatively un-involved partners.
phase attack.

This was to be a two

The first phase was Joseph Malik's return to

the Security Council, after an absence since January, and
his immediate effort to attempt to get passage of an Indian
proposal for a cease fire, and have Peking given China's
seat at the UN.

This period also saw a steady change in

the military situation as the Pusan perimeter stabilized and
U N reinforcements began to arrive in numbers.

The length and

fragility of the KPLA supply line began to have their effects
on KPLA combat pcwar as US Air Force interdiction efforts
ware increased.

The changed military situation became mani

fest with the defeat of the crack 6th KPLA division near
Masan, 7-11 August.
As a result of this change, the Chinese leadership
perceived an increasing threat situation.

This concern was
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communicated in a grave new assessment of the Korean wax situ
ation in which the first estimates of U N strength appeared in
Jen Min Pao a major daily newspaper used by the CCP leadership
to orient the masses on 13 August.

The article concluded,

"This undoubtedly increases the difficulty of the Korean
people and cannot but compel the Korean people to prepare for
a bitter and prolonged war".

Although defeat was not men

tioned directly in the article, it was obviously a possibility.
Of interest here is that there still appears no consideration
of Chinese commitment to North Korea.
The 20th of August signalled the second portion of the
new communist tactics, with Chou En Lai sending a telegram
to the United Nations stating, "Korea is China's neighbor.
The Chinese people can not but be concerned about the solution
of the Korean people . . . It must and can be settled peace162
fully".
The importance of this message is two fold. First,
it was an effort to gain a peaceful, and hopefully pro
communist, settlement and, more importantly, it was the first
time Peking had indicated an immediate interest in Korea.
This message is highly significant as a sign of early percep
tion of possible threat and efforts to diffuse the situation.
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This change in attitude can be further demonsrated in
two separate events happening during this time, the "Resist
American invasion of Taiwan and Korea" campaign, and the CCP
response to General MacArthur's visit to Taiwan.

Both of

these events were used for the internal mobilization of the
Chinese people.

The former was a propaganda campaign con

ducted by the CCP, off-and-on from this time forward, to
begin the mobilization process against the danger of these
"foreign devils".

It is significant, however, that the

campaign very carefully avoided making or encouraging any
material commitments.

The importance of MacArthur1s visit

to Taiwan lies in China's xenophobic fear (admittedly rein
forced by some of MacArthur's statements) of a "sinister
plot" between Mac Arthur and arch-foe Chiang Kai Shek*
of these campaigns had several objectives.

Both

The primary

purposes being to counter anxiety about war, increase
pressure on anti-communist elements in China, spur reconstruc
tion and land reform, and spur the development of numerous
163
grassroots communist organization committees.
An article in World Culture shows clearly the extent
of change that came about in China's perception of threat
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during the month of August.

Going from cautious, measured

communications to this one, on the 20th which stated, in
part, "The barbarous action of American imperialism and its
hangers-on in invading Korea . . .

Seriously threatens the

security of China in particular ... it is impossible to
solve the Korean problem without the participation of its
164
closest neighbor, China . . . "
It is certainly more than
coincidental that this article follows the speech of Mr.
Austin, the US representative to the UN Security Council,
who delivered a strong rejection of Malik's peace proposals
and of PRC's right to sit in the UN on 17 August.

This

effectively ended any realistic hope the communists had of
accomplishing a favorable diplomatic end to the Korean con
flict.

An additional comment by Austin that the UN forces'

objective would be the unification of all of Korea, was
undoubtedly pregnant with implications for the Chinese. It
can easily be seen that the level of perceived threat had
risen measureably.

China was starting to define its

critical boundary; not yet clearly - but it would be so
defined in early October.
The World Culture article of 20 August was important
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for yet another reason.

This statement of immediate interest

in the outcome in Korea was the first sign by the Chinese
decision unit's growing sense of time.

Realizing that the

military situation was changing, the CCP leadership had to
be cognizant of a limited, but poorly defined, amount of time
in which to determine their course of action.

The events of

the following months would show a positive relationship be 
tween the CCP decision unit's perception of time pressure and
its development of its critical boundary on the Korean
peninsula.
In the period June to August 1950, then, we have seen
China move from a casual interest to vital concern in the
outcome in Korea.

This complete turnaround was by no means

remarkable from the Chinese perspective of recent events.
The low threat conditions of the early part of this period
allowed China to maintain her natural orientation - concern
primarily with internal matters.

But as the military situa

tion changed, the level of threat increased dramatically.
China's concern with the expected UN counter-attack, the
effect it would have on China's borders and political situa
tion and the middle kingdom sensitivity, all made themselves
felt.
MACARTHUR MO vES NORTH:

From the last week of August to

October 16 a chain of events occurred which saw the
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acceleration of hostility and manifestation of many of the
classic signs of conflict in a crisis period.

Time became

increasingly critical; opponents' motives were explained in
a more simplistic stereotyped manner; and effective communi
cation lessened.
This period ushered in the coordination of Sino-Soviet
responses to the deepening situation.
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The period could

be characterized as one of challenge and response.

As per

ceived from the communist view point, the "imperialist
166
challenge" came in three major forms:
a.

Demands by prominent Americans for more aggressive

action against the Sino-S0viet bloc.
b.

Alleged air intrusions over China.

c.

Warnings by Truman to China not to enter the war.

Two prominent Americans, Douglas Mac Arthur and Naval
Secretary Matthews, both made comments that had great impact
on Chinese perceptions of increasing threat, serving to
reinforce their fears.

Secretary Matthews in a major speech

on 25 August advocated "instituting a war to compel
cooperation for years . . . "
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MacArthur, in a speech prepared for a VFW meeting, stated that
there should be no "misconceptions • • . concerning the rela
tionship of Taiwan to our strategic potential in the Pacific".
He stressed that from the island chain "we can dominate with
air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapcre".
MacArthur called Taiwan "an unsinkable aircraft carrier and
168
submarine tender".
The Truman administration made efforts
several days later to correct these statements by public
apologies.

However these statements were seen by Peking as

a crude effort to try to conceal the true intent of America.
This evaluation by the Chinese leadership was the product of
the interaction of several of the factors discussed in the
first chapter.

The "information" (speeches) fit the stereo

types held by the PRC leadership nicely and so were accepted;
no consideration was given to the complexity of American
politics or to which speakers were actually spokesmen and
which spoke for themselves.

The ability to separate the

dangerous from the trivial was impaired in their xenophobic
fear of a US - KMT attack.
Shortly sufter these statements were made Peking reported
two alleged air intrusions into their airspace.
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On 27
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September a US plane was reported to have strafed a rail
169
terminal, attendant yards and a nearby airfield*
The
United States said a mistake was possible but a method of
verification could not be settled on and so the matter was
left open.

Two days later, on 29 September another attack
170
was reported, this time on fishing boats on the Yalu.
No
American response to this charge was forthcoming.
Shortly after these events there followed a third
reinforcement to China's perception of increasing threat.
This reinforcement came in the form of a direct warning by
President Truman against PRC involvement in Korea.
1 September President Truman declared;

On

"We do not want the

fighting in Korea to spread to a general war; it will not
spread unless communist imperialism draws other armies and
governments into the fight of the aggressors against the
United States.

We hope in particular that the people of

China will not be misled or forced into fighting against
the United Nations".
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The intent of this message was to
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assure the PRC that the United States had no aggressive tend
encies.

Almost the exact opposite was perceived.

CPR response to these various "imperialist" challenges
took an overt, and most likely, a covert form.

China's

overt response to these activities was a good indicator of
the level of threat perceived.

This action took the form of

a series of intense diplomatic protests and militant domestic
propaganda.

This was particularly so with the air intrusions.

In content and extent this campaign was significant as the
first clear mobilization of the Chinese public for possible
military action.

Reports were printed from all over China

of meetings in which thousands offered to go off to war to
"teach the American aggressors a lesson", as Peking began the
process of mobilizing the populace to a higher state of
mental preparation.

The covert responses to these develop

ments of late September remain closed to confirmation but
it appears that, probably, soma redeployment of elements of
the third field army took place during this time.

The

immediate implication of these events from China's point of
view was the continuing shrinkage of available alternate
courses of action to an overt military response.

Each new

action or statement by the UN forces, particularly the
Americans, further restricting the perceived room, time, and
range for response.
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Of interest at this point was a new emphasis in
terminology which indicates a switch in the propaganda
image of the United States from a "paper tiger" to a "mad
dog" (from helplessness to ferocity).

The switch was in

ceasing to use the term for passive resistance in addressing
action against the US, and replacing it with the term "K'ang
Yi", denoting active resistance of the sort found in the
first fight against the Japanese or the KMT.
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On 15 September, the US X Corps landed at Inchon.
Within two weeks the KPLA was, for all intents and purposes,
destroyed.

The swift collapse of the North Korean Army

accelerated efforts by both the Soviets and Chinese to halt
the war.

The ambiguity of the US position, and the desire

to avoid war caused the CCP leadership to attempt to
communicate their rapidly rising perception of threat in the
form of making clearer their intent to enter the war, if
their critical boundary, now defined as the 38th parallel,
was penetrated.
In an effort to communicate the degree of involvement,
itself an indicator of perceived threat, that China now
felt in the rapidly deteriorating situation in Korea, Chou
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En Lai acknowledged on the 22nd of September that China was
indeed providing forces to the KPLA and implied further
assistance": • • • we clearly affirm that we will always
stand on the side of the Korean people • • • and resolutely
oppose the imperialist acts of American imperialist
aggressors".
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Coinciding with this message, renewed war

alerts appeared in the Chinese papers as Peking began the
mobilization process toward war.
Covert communications were tried to indicate the
crisis stage was being approached.

On 25 September the

Indian ambassador to Peking, Mr. K. M. Panikkar, was told
bluntly by the PLA acting chief of staff that "China would
not sit back with folded hands and let America come up to
the /Sino-Korean/ border . . .

We know what we are in for,

but at all costs American aggression has to be stopped.
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As South Korean troops prepared to cross the 38th
parallel, Chou delivered the strongest warning yet on
30 September speaking to the CCP central committee Chou
stated, "The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate
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foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing
their neighbors being savagely slaughtered*'.

1 7 5

^

~

On 2

October the last warning was issued when the Indian Ambassa
dor, Panikkar, was told, in a dramatic midnight meeting with
Chou En Lai, that if the United States crossed the 33th
176
parallel it would be considered causus belli.
Here, at
last, was a clear statement of what China considered to be
its critical boundary, however the warning was to go u n 
heeded.
On 7th October elements of the United States First
Cavalry Division crossed the 38th parallel as the UN General
Assembly endorsed "all appropriate steps to ensure a
condition of stability throughout Korea".

With these two

events at hand, China felt her options reduced to one.

US

and UN actions had clearly indicated, to the Chinese mind,
their intent on placing China in a clearly intolerable
situation.
On approximately 16 October 1950 the lead elements of
the Peoples Liberation Fourth Field Army crossed over the
Yalu into North Korea, and the issued was joined.
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This time period showed a marked change in the intent
of PRC communications but with almost no effect, as the CPR
leadership changed direction after Inchon from propaganda to
statements of intent.

It could be seen how more direct, e x 

plicit, and urgent the messages because as the PRC attempted
to convey the crisis situation they perceived, and hence found
themselves in.

The conflict environment reached the crisis

threshold as United Nations troops penetrated what had b e 
come China's critical boundary, China's alternatives were
seen as non existant and thus she went to wax.
ROLE OF THREAT AND TIME PERCEPTION:

As the reader mentally

watches Lin Piao's field army trudge off in the late summer's
dust to mast its destiny, certain factors and considerations
should be clearer about the relationship of threat percep
tion and the decisions of the Peoples Republic of China in
entering the Korean war.
In developing the relationship, we saw in the first
chapter that conflict has certain characteristics such as
a lack of definite territorial (physical or psychological)
limits, communication problems, a significant audience
(in this case the international community- in particular the
Asian nations), and incomplete information.

We noted the

"spiral effect" and selective perception phenomenon.

Of

immediate concern was the effect of high threat on decision
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makers*

Here we saw that they tend to develop problem

solving rigidity, rely more on stereotypes, have lower tol
erance to ambiguity, and confuse important and trivial fac
tors*
T o this analytical framework we added information about
the conceptual makeup and characteristics of the Chinese
leadership*

Here three factors were salient; the Chinese,

ideological, and experimental factors*

To this were added

the economic and political situation, which produced strong
considerations for internal orientation as opposed to e x 
ternal interest, and a high degree of sensitivity about the
presence of non-communist elements on the borders*
With the environment thus defined a series of key
communications and situations were evaluated*

The initial

period was found to be one of perceived low or no threat,
and no sense of time urgency and was so reflected in the
massages of this period (25 June- 20 August)*

As the situa

tion became more ambiguous (incomplete information) the
perceived threat began to slowly rise*

Communications

problems, namely the failure to project effectively to the
American decision-makers the Chinese intentions and vice
versa, and the faulty perceptual framework of the CCP leaders,
accelerated the level of perceived threat as was shown in
the content and intent of their internal and external commu-
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nications*

The interplay of various basic themes (foreign

devils, sphere of influence, inevitability of conflict)
interacted with the above to produce the observed results*
In the final stage (25 Sept - 16 October) the per
ceived threat became increasingly greater, flexibility in
creasingly less, time increasingly less adequate, and the
range of viable alternate decisions perceived to be reduced
to one*
Some conclusions can be drawn from this complex mass
of interacting variables which are worth presentation. First,
the evidence available does not support the idea that the
industrial basin in Manchuria was a vital consideration*
The issue was ignored by PRC leaders in speaking both in
ternally and externally*

Secondly, the atomic bomb was not

a predominant factor of deterrence, witness the full state
ment of PLA acting Chief of Staff 25 Sept* 1950*

Addi

tionally the actual primary moving factors in C h i n a ’s
decision to enter the war can be ordered by the level of
threat, which the CCP decision-making elite perceived to
their critical physical and/or ideological boundaries•

In

order of precedence they are:
1*

The instability of the internal political situa

tion made it imperative that no anti-communist nation bor
dered on China to aid and abet those anti-communist elements
inside China*
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2*

Uncertainty that UN Forces under the leadership of

General MacArthur would stop at the Yalu*
3.

A group of factors concerning Japan, as perceived:
a* The threat of Japanese mi lit airy resurgency if

the US were to be totally victorious in unifying the Korean
peninsula*
b.

Control of the Korean peninsula allowed the

historical route for invasion to be available to a US-Japan
axis*
4.

Factors having to do with prestige and the interest

ed audience*
a*

Failure to respond would cause the loss of

standing as the third w o r l d ’s "progressive" leader*
b*

Failure to respond would automatically surrender

C h i n a ’s "right” to be heard and heeded in Asia*
c.

American dominance would increase its influence

and lessen that of China*
A survey of the material presented on the CCP decision
unit fails to disconfirm any of the three working hypotheses*
However, it must be said that due to the lack of access to
diaries or internal communications, it was possible only to
establish a reasonable inference that time became an in
creasingly salient factor*

The other two propositions could

be demonstrated with some certitude*
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From the internal political situation of Communist
China developed early in this chapter it is easy to see that
the long range goals of the CCP leadership did not include
a major war with the United States*

Indeed the statement of

the acting Chief of Staff says quite plainly that the
immediate, internal, situation was so perceived that the
decision unit felt it had to risk its very existence rather
than have a non-communist government on its borders.
With the abrupt reversal in the military situation
brought about by Inchon, China was forced to conclude that
her intervention would probably be necessary.

During this

period between the Inchon landing and the crossing of the
38th parallel, the PRC moved from non-involvement to inter
vention*

Given the limited time objectively available, and

the inferred perception of time pressure, the fact that the
decision unit appears to have gone through a one-choice
sequence similar to the US decision unit previously dis
cussed is not surprising.

Nowhere in the available diplo

matic documents is there any indication of any alternative
being seriously pursued*

Undoubtably the ideological and

experience components of the decision u n i t ’s frame of refer
ence had a considerable impact in this filtering process
which led them to believe they only had one option open
to them.

148

So far the crisis periods studied have ended In failure
in the sense that all have concluded with a state of open
warfare being declared*

The next chapter will take a look

at a period in which war, possibly World War III, was
avoided*

CHAPTER V

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS:

1962

"Good evening, my fellow citizens
>

« • • within the past week, un
mistakable evidence has estab
lished the fact that a series of
missile sites is now in prepara
tion on that imprisoned island
(Cuba) . . ,"177
From these introductory remarks on the evening of 22
October, 1962, President John F. Kennedy went on to inform
the nation and the world of a decision which would be con
sidered by many as one of the most critical made in this
century.

178

It was certainly the most dangerous confronta

tion between the Soviet Union and the United States during
the cold war period.

The President however reluctantly,
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The Cuban Crisis
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indicated in his address that the United States would not
tolerate any Soviet missile presence just 90 miles from
its shores, and was prepared if necessary to risk a nuclear
holocaust to prevent it.

The crisis has frequently been

called a psychological watershed in Soviet-American rela
tions.

It has been said that a new era of detente dawned

because both sides "went to the brink and looked into the
abyss and came away shaken".
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The Cuban crisis of 1962 was to have a significant
effect on the relations of the United States and the
Organization of American States (OAS) and N.A.T.O.

These

relationships were both positively and negatively affected
by the events of October 1962.

The truly profound changes

that occurred, however, were between the Soviet Union and
China, with the Chinese charges of adventurism accelerating
180
the already manifest fractionalization of the Communist bloc.
A word should be said about the chronological para
meters of this survey of the missile crisis.

Conventionally,

the study of this event is bracketed by the first photo-
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graphic evidence (14 October 1962) and the agreement by
Kruschev to remove the missiles some 13 days later (27
October).

However, for the purpose of this study, it is

unnecessary to analyze in any detail the events after 19
October as the basic decision on policy direction was made
on this date.

Decisions and actions occurring during the

remainder of the crisis period were in essence those required
to implement and enforce the primary decision.
To present this material in a manner conducive to
developing an adequate focus on the factors under investi
gation, the chapter has been divided into sections.

The

external and internal situations are first developed, these
sore followed by the Soviet efforts to screen the Cuban base
preparations.

The section is concluded with the early in

dicators to the missile emplacement•

With the environment

in which the crisis occurred thus developed, the remainder
of the chapter deals xvith the events occurring between 14-19
October 1962.

The paper is concluded with some observations

on the impact of the information generated on the working
hypotheses being considered.
The external, or international, setting for the
momentous events of October 1962 revolved around the set of
relationships that had developed from the Cold War following
World War II.

Particularly germane to the event under study
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was the illusory "missile gap" which had been generated in
America for political reasons.

A side effect of this was a

residual sensitivity to any and all Soviet missile advances.
Although in fact the United States had more missiles avail181
able for a second strike than Russia had for a first strike,
the fear of superior Soviet capabilities was a constant, and
not insignificant, factor in American actions.
The Soviets followed a strategy of "minimum deterrent"
during the 1955-1960 period but changed to increased nuclear
weapons spending in 1961 to counter the alarming difference
they perceived in nuclear strength.
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That same year

President Kennedy met Kruschev for the first time in June in
Vienna.

Kennedy came away from that meeting considerably

shaken and worried about the possibilities of confrontation
with the Soviets.

It appears that this meeting also affec

ted the Soviet leader, but in the opposite direction.

Later

information indicates that Kruschev felt that Kennedy lacked
the constitution to stand up under pressure, and was un183
willing to go to the precipice.
The Soviet attempt to
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emplace missiles under the very nose of America could certain
ly be more easily understood on such an assumption.
The general background of the Cuban Missile Crisis is
probably one of the darkest periods of the Cold War.

Within

the framework dictated by the Cold War, the events leading up
to the crisis included the downing of a U-2 reconaissance
aircraft over Russia in the spring of 1960, the consequent
collapse of the Paris Summit conference, continued testing
of high tonnage nuclear weapons, periodic Berlin crises,
erection of the Berlin Wall, the threat of new Soviet efforts
against Berlin after the November 1962 elections, and the
184
continuing ramifications of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
The Bay of Pigs in particular had considerable impact
on the manner in which the missile crisis was conducted.
For the puritan Americans, the moral "cost” had been extreme
ly high.

Many of the President's most immediate advisors

were determined that America would not again be cast in the
role of a blatent practitioner of power politics.

Many

have said the dismal failure had a great impact on the
President himself and that he felt discredited in the eyes
185
of his countryman and the world.
A final result of the
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Bay of Pigs was its impact on the Soviet leadership; Kruschev
appears to have believed the President was reckless in the
use of force and lacking the courage to use sufficient re186
sources to ensure victory.
By the summer of 1962 rumors began to be heard with in
creasing frequency that something was happening in northern
Cuba.

Shortly before the increased frequency of reports,

Raul Castro had gone to Moscow.

When he arrived he was met

by Defense Minister Malinovsky and the two highest officers
187 ^
in the Russian Air Force and Air Defense commands.
IX
appears that this visit established what items that Ernesto
"Che'“Guevara would "request" during his upcoming visit
that August •
The visit by Che' saw a highly unusual treaty signed;
Russia normally makes its clients pay twice for their mili
tary goods-first in money and second in political influence.
In the treaty with Cuba, Russia forgave all past debts for
military equipment and in return received the right to
build a fishing harbour.

The American intelligence

community saw this as a cover for Soviet submarines, intel-
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ligence gathering trawlers and a possible build up for
"something big".

188

In retrospect the CIA believes the

decision to put missiles into Cuba was made at the end of
189
July and material began to arrive in early September*
As the material covertly began to arrive in Cuba, the
Soviets laid down the gaunt Ifet to the United States in the
form of a specific warning*
printed the following:

On September 11, 1962, Tass

**The government of the Soviet Union

has authorized Tass to state that there is no need for the
Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of
aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country,
for instance Cuba • • •

We have said and we do repeat that

if war is unleashed, if the aggressor makes an attempt on
one state or another and that state asks for assistance,
The Soviet Union has the responsibility to render assis190
tance from its own territory to any peace-loving state • *"
And so the external situation was set between a President
who desperately wanted to regain the prestige lost at the
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Bay of Pigs and the Premier who did not believe he had the
fortitude to do it*
The Bay of Pigs also affected the internal environment
as well*

Part of the reason the President did not act

sooner was that the only agency among the intelligence
community that was giving credence to the report coming
from Cuba since mid-summer was the CIA and its director,
John McCona*

The CIA was at the time considerably discredit

ed for its poor estimates of Cuban national reaction to the
191
Bay of Pigs invasion*
It had predicated that the Cuban
people would rise up against Castro*

As a consequence the

President was very cautious in his estimates and relied al
most exclusively on specially trained agents (which had for
the most part been eliminated by Castro by this time), and
U-2 flights*
By late August soma evidence was becoming available
that confirmed increased activity by the Russians*

On 24

August the State Department Intelligence Chief, Roger
Hilsmann, acknowledged that the Soviets had sent 3-5000
192
military technicians and goods to Cuba*
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Without question, the intensity of political sensitivity
was increased several notches by the fact that Congressional
off-year elections were only a few months off.

Senator

Capehart, Republican, running for re-election, initiated one
of the earliest charges when, on 28 August, he claimed that
Soviet combat troops were in Cuba and demanded an immediate
invasion*

Some three days later an American reconaissance

bomber was allegedly fired upon by Cuban vessels and Senator
Keating took the floor of the Senate to charge that in addi
tion to military supplies some 1200 Russian troops in
fatigues had been landed*

193

From the end of August onward Cuba was in the head
lines constantly*

Intense Congressional pressure began to

build up against the possibility of a Soviet offensive
military build-up*

President Kennedy, forced to defend his

policies of inaction against Republican critics, became
more and more precise in his public statements as to what
the United States would and would not tolerate in Cuba*
(At a campaign stop a sign was held up saying "Less ProfileMore Courage - We want Action on Cuba")*
During the month of Septexrber, the verbal war steadily
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rose in intensity for the President*

On 2 September an

announcement by the Soviets that they had agreed to provide
Cuba with further arms and technical assistance in order to
meet the threat from "aggressive Capitalist sources" trig
gered charges from Senators Keating and Thurmond that the
situation was becoming more serious*

The Administration

officials denied there was any new danger*

Two days later,

on 4 September, the President attempted to allay the rising
concern both at home and abroad about the Cuban situation
when he said; "There is no evidence * • • of the presence
of offensive ground- to - ground missiles or of other sig
nificant offensive capability • • • were it to be otherwise
194
the gravest issues would arise"*
Growing concern became manifest during this period
in the form of fear that Castro would attempt to export
part of his new found military armory to other South American
countries*

A measure of the frustration felt by many

citizens can be seen in this extract from the Miami Herald
which said, in part, "People will not long understand why
US troops are sent to root out Communism in South Vietnam
when we do nothing to prevent the Russians from taking
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. 195
over Cuba"*
The political pressure was maintained and other Republi
cans joined the action*

On 7 September the President was

forced by Republican maneuvers to approve the resolution re
questing authority to call up 150,000 reservists if Kennedy
felt compelled on 13 September to hold a news conference on
Cuba and tell the nation that the Soviet shipments did not
constitute a serious threat to the United States*

However,

he did carefully list the limits beyond which the US would
react*

"If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were

to endanger or interfere with pur security in any way •*• or
become an offensive base of significant capacity for the
Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done
196
to protect its own security"*
On the 9th of September the Board of National Estimate
met in Washington to determine the probability of what the
Soviets would do*

Considering the possibility that the

Russians might put missiles on Cuba to enhance their image
in South America and increase their bargaining position in
Berlin, the board nevertheless held this course of action to
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to be unlikely*

The board spoke for the intelligence

community with the exception of the CIA, when it said that
the likelihood of a violent US reaction, and the consistent
Soviet policy of not employing missiles outside Russia proper,
made that course of action improbable*

197

The next few days were to see increased political con
sensus on the urgency of the Cuban question*

Congress

passed a joint resolution stating a willingness to use what
ever force necessary*

Also the first definite information

on the exist since of missiles in Cuba became available*

On

the 21st an agent saw part of a tailpiece for a rocket larger
than a SAM and got the information out*

Throughout the rest

of September and early October, campaign discussions about
American policy towards Cuba continued to hold the public's
interest*

In answer to the Republicans charges of a "do

nothing" policy and demand for quarantine (Nixon), blockade
(Mundt, Scott, Keating), or invasion (Goldwater, Thurmond),
Democrats countered with charges of "hot-blooded extremists"
who were urging rash action*

By mid October the Republican

National Chairman declared that Cuba had become "the dominant

197
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issue of the 1962 campaign”*

While in the United States the argument over the presence,
or lack of presence, of Soviet missiles had advocates on both
sides, the Russians consistently denied any plans to install
missiles anywhere outside of the Soviet Union*

The disclaim

ers started as early as July of 1960 when Kruschev stated that
"figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillerymen can
support the Cuban people with their rocket fire”, and again
in January of 1961 - "Alarming news is coming • • • they
/the Americans/ are trying to present the case as though rock
et bases of the Soviet Union are being set up * * • in Cuba*
It is well known that this is foul slander"*
after the Bay of Pigs (14 April 1962)

Again shortly

"As for the Soviet

Union • • • our government does not seek any advantages or
199
priviledge in Cuba* We do not have any bases in Cuba”*
Official Washington tended to accept these statements
as factual because they saw no reason to doubt Kruschev*
Russia had never put Soviet missiles in a foreign country*
It was not until September of the following year that the
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Soviets said anything about the arms build-up going on in
Cuba, admitting on the second that they were providing
"armaments'* and "specialists for training Cuban serviceman"*
On 4 September the Russians became more active in deceptive
efforts*

The Soviet ambassador to Washington (Anatoliy:

Dobrynin) attempted to reassure Kennedy that the Soviet Union
would keep pressure off during the election campaign*

The

Ambassador said that he was not aware of any Soviet missiles
sent to Cuba and stressed that Russia would not put the
200

power to initiate a nuclear war in the hands of the Cubans*
This claim was reinforced by a message from Kruschev to

Kennedy on 6 September promising that "nothing will be under
taken before the American Congressional elections that
could complicate the international situation * -* provided there
201

is no action taken on the other side • • •"

This was an

effort on the part of the Russian leader to prevent Kennedy
from initiating any interference, such as reconnaissance
flights, in Cuba during the missile site construction*
However for a variety of reasons most of the protesta-
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tions of purity of thought and act fell on deaf ears*

The

psychological measure of Kruschev taken by Kennedy at Vienna
was not consistent with such a view*

Additionally, and more

significantly, indicators began to appear in the intelligence
communications of a significant rise in the level of activi
ty in Cuba as early as late July 1962*

It was during the

latter part of July that the sudden increase in tonnage from
the Soviet Union caught the analyst attention*

Most of the

traffic was going into the northern coastal port of Mariel
in the Province of Pinar del Rio*

All local nationals who

lived in the vicinity of the docks were forced to move and
202

only Soviet guards and longshoremen worked on the boats*

It was late August before the US Government began to
' expose publicly the information it was gathering*

On 24

August Roger HiIsman, Chief of the Intelligence Division,
gave State Department reporters a background briefing*

The

reporters were informed that during the July-August period
over 100 ships had come into Cuba, with 20 of the ships
carrying large quantities of transport, electrical, and
construction equipment.

Also identified were communica

tions and radar vans, trucks, said mobile generators* Hilsman
indicated that they were probably for a defensive system to
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include air defense missiles*

203

Just two days prior to this briefing the CIA director
had advised the President that he felt the SAM (surface-toair missile) SA-2s coming into Cuba were a prelude to the
arrival of offensive missiles*

204

McCone had long expected

this deployment because of the geographical advantages of
Cuba:

it provided a launch platform which gave Russia's

1000-mile rockets the ability to strike directly at one of
the democracies but could not be turned around and used
against Russia*

Another important factor in McCone's

deduction was that the pattern in which the SAM's were be**
ing deployed matched those described by Col* Penkovsky after
he defected to the West*

205

McCone reasoned that missiles

of the sophistication of the SA-2, which were believed to
have.shot down Power's U-2, would not have been deployed
except to defend something of even greater value*

It should

be noted, though, to put these ideas in context, McCone, was
alone among the intelligence agency chiefs in this opinion*
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The conventional wisdom of the day was that the Russians would
not change their well-established policy of not stationing
their nuclear weapons outside of the Soviet Union*
As a consequence of his analysis, the CIA chief
ordered U-2 flights for 5, 17, 26, and 29 September and 7
206
October*
It was the mission on the 29th which first
identified SAMfs in position*

At approximately the same time

reports arrived that five or six Soviet ships with oversize
hatches, capable of taking 70 foot missiles, had docked at
night under conditions of extraordinary secrecy*

207

Odd-shaped

crates were subsequently seen in transit to an abandoned
airfield*
bombers*

These crates turned out to be strategic nuclear
When all this was conveyed to the President, he

indicated growing concern about the possibility that Kruschev
hoped to provoke him into another entanglement in Cuba which
would make a martyr out of Castro and wreck US efforts in
Latin America and Berlin*
As September slipped into October, the CIA chief was
able to gain presidential permission for additional U-2
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flights over Cuba*

After a five day effort, the super

secret committee on Overhead Reconaissance (COMOR) gave ap208
proval for the missions*
Based on increasing information
of feverish construction, the area around a town in western
Cuba named San Cristobal was chosen for the first mission*
Due to weather difficulties this mission was not able to be
flown until 14 October - the first day of crisis*
As can be readily seen by reflecting on the situational
set of this period, the President and his advisors were al
ready in a threat environment of some measure*

Although by

no means of crisis proportions, as then perceived, the infor
mation available was frequently contradictory or ambiguous*
The spectre of the Soviet Premier and his perceived willing
ness to invite a nuclear confrontation was undoubtably a
significant factor*

The clamor of the opposition party, the

disagreement among the intelligence agencies and the scars
of the Bay of Pigs all combined to produce a highly charged
atmosphere into which a series of photographs were introduced
that triggered one of the major confrontations of the century*
While a single dull-black U-2 reconnaisance aircraft
winged its way south on Sunday, 14 October, Senator Kenneth
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Keating (R-NY) sounded the alarm that he had information from
sources **which have been 100 per cent reliable” that six in
termediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) sites were under
construction in Cuba*

Keating called on Kennedy to either

confirm or deny the charge*

That same afternoon, McGeorge

Bundy, Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs,
in an interview, stated that "• * * I know there is no present
evidence, and I think there is no present likelihood • • •
the Soviet government would • • • attempt to install a major
—
—
209
offensive capability /in Cuba/ • • *•
Bundy dismissed
John McCone1s notion on Soviet missiles as "beyond belief"*
This view, aptly reflects both the policy stand adopted by
the administration and, surely, the views of the majority of
the Presidentfs advisors in private*

210

Thus, even though

adequate information was at hand to allow a proper interpre
tation of what was occurring, the decision-makers, through
a process of selective screening of stimuli, were molding
their observations to agree with their pre-formed concepts*
This was to insure a perceptual, as opposed to objective,
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surprise condition in the Executive Committee (EXCOM)*
By mid-morning of the following day, (15th) the photos
had been processed and analyzed*

What was discovered was a

field enclosed by woods near San Cristobal with the earth
scarred in a four-clash pattern never before observed out
side Russia itself*

No ballistic missiles were observed on

this first day but a "tent city" and identifiable missile
erectors, launchers and transporters were located in the
vicinity*

To a skilled interpreter of aerial photography

thoroughly familiar with the vast U-2 portfolio of medium
range missile sites, the evidence was impressive, if not yet
conclusive* 211

The information was presented that evening

to Rosewell Gilpatrick by the DIA Chief, LTG Carroll*
Gilpatrick had the DIA Chief double check the photos and
prepared to brief MacNamara the following morning (16th)*
Carrol also called Bundy at about 8:30 pm at a dinner
party*

After being informed by Bundy of the news, Paul

Njtze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for international
Affairs, recalled " * * * we both knew that the Pentagon had
prepared contingency plans for an invasion or an air strike*
We both felt that either plan, in execution, would have
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212
grave consequences around the world * • •”

During this

period other key administration officials were also being
notified*
With this notification, these key officials began to
live two lives; one, on the surface, was business as usual,
but below that existed a secret life of tense meetings,
awareness of the possibility of imminent disaster, and
enormous responsibility*

A sense of speed in acting became

a pervasive; all possibilities for successful action were
dependent on developing an effective response before the
Russians finished their sites*

To complete the picture, no

body knew how long it would take the Russians to do it*
At 7:30 the next morning the reconfirmed evidence was
before Secretary MacNamara, but because of the lack of actual
missiles themselves, MacNamara felt that the evidence was in
sufficient*

Bundy, however, decided that the President should

be informed and told him at 8 AM* After confirming that the
information was unquestionably correct, the President ordered
a secret meeting for 11:45 that morning*

To attend were

the President, Bundy, Alexis Johnson, Dean Rusk, MacNamara,
Robert Kennedy, Generals Taylor and Carter, Gilpatric, George

212
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Ball, Edwin Martin, Sorensen, Douglas Dillon, Ambassador
213
Bohlen, and Ken O'Donnell*
This group of 14 advisors was
later to become known as the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council (EXCOM).
In preparing for the first meeting, Rusk noted that
"it was obvious • • • that time would be the essential factor*
We would have to choose between the risk of eliminating the
weapons and the risk of allowing sufficient time for them to
become operational"*

214

The first meeting was dominated by

somber reflections on the nature of the challenge from
Moscow*

Robert Kennedy was later to recall, "We all agreed

that in the end that if the Russians were ready to go to
nuclear war

over Cuba, they

were ready togo to nuclear war,

and that was that*
then as six

So we might as well have the show down
215
months later".
Douglas Dillon further set the

mood of theassemblage when he noted that

"everyone around

the table recognized that we we rein a major crisis*

We didn't

know that day if the country would come through it with
Washington intact"*

216

214
Stewart Alsop, "In Tima of Crisis"
Saturday Evening Post, 8 Dec* 62, 16*,
215
Ole R* Holsfi, Crisis:
(London, 1972) 179*

Escalation - War

216Louise Fitzsimmons, The Kennedy Doctrine
(New York, 1972) 141.

171

The President's first response was one that guided his
217
conduct for the rest of the crisis*
felt Khruschev had
purposefully deceived him and was privately furious with him
for it*

From the outset, the President was determined to re

move the missiles from Cuba*

It appears that he also believed

that a confrontation was necessary*

The President's experi

ence with Khruschev at Vienna led him to believe that the
probable central motive for the Soviet challenge was that the
move was a major challenge by Khruschev of the American leader's will and resolve*

218

.The question formulated then by

the President for his advisors to ponder was not "should it
be done", but rather "how will we do it?"

With this decision,

the President effectively limited the range of alternatives
open to the EXCOM*

As a consequence those approaches which

might have produced an international result favorably

to the

US were never seriously considered*
Evidence that the discovery of missile sites was a true
surprise was aptly stated by the Attorney General when he
characterized those at the Excom's first meeting as being in
a state of "stunned surprise" and "shocked incredulity"*
217
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Along with this sense of surprise and the compressed time
available, there also existed a sense of frustration in that
there appeared to be no "right" solution to their quandry;
Sorensen noted it when he said that if the Excom failed to
act, General De Gaulle and other leaders would lose faith in
our resolve and if we did act with force, that the Latin
American and underdeveloped nations would decry American
power politics.

219

The President made two decisions that first day; first
to increase the number of U-2 flights over Cuba, and second
that there would be no disclosure to the American people
until the decisions had been made about the course of action
to be followed.

With this the President left to fulfill his

campaign committments•

The first day's discussions amounted,

in Dean Rusk's phrase, to "boxing the compass”.

The entire

range of possible American responses were reviewed.

The

discussion want round and around without a beginning or an
end.

The first day's discussions ended with a two-way split

between those who felt immediate action was the answer and
those who wanted other means.

There were generally four

major approaches: 1) do nothing, 2) use diplomatic and U N
channels, 3) "surprise" air strike, and 4) blockade.
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this first Excom meeting, the group fell into a rough pattern
in which Theodore Sorensen stated that " • • • the bulk of
our time Tuesday through Friday was spent in George Ball's
conference room canvassing all the possible courses as the
President had requested, and preparing back-up material for
them:

suggested time schedules or scenarios, draft messages,

military estimates and predictions of Soviet and Cuban
responses"•2 2 0
Wednesday, the 17th of October, saw the President out
of Washington to fulfill a campaign committment to Abraham
Ribicoff in Waterbury, Connecticut*

While the President was

gone the Excom considered, but adopted none of, the several
different plans under study*

The group did however issue

the instructions necessary to set the military machinery
working towards providing the necessary "muscle" to imple
ment whatever policy the President might decide upon*

In

Kennedy's absence, the Excom sat through much of the day
and the night in Ball's conference room at the State Depart
ment*

People came and went as their duties allowed; some

listened, some talked, some took notes*

As the day wore

on, the conference was gradually brought under control
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by Robert Kennedy; the informal leadership was his by default
of Rusk and MacNamara*
Beginning with the evening of the 16th, the US Intelli
gence Board met each following morning at 8:30 am to review
the latest U-2 photos and estimate the potential danger
present*
light:

On the 17th the following new information came to
1) additional launchers were now in the San Cristobal

area, 2) 28 launcher pads in various stages of completion had
been identified, and 3) for the first time MRBM (1000 mile),
and IRBM (2000 mile) "first strike" (i*e* not in hardened
sites) missiles were located*

221

Estimates of the board

held that the Soviets could deliver approximately 40 nuclear
warheads on targets as far west as Wyoming.

Although no w a r 

heads had been identified, the board felt it made no military
sense to put missiles in position without warheads.
There was considerable discussion this day as to the
degree of increased danger from the Soviet rockets being 90
miles off the American coast.

One group maintained that it

did not alter the nuclear balance and the other took the
opposite stand.
ously important.

However, all agreed that speed was tremend
The reports indicated that the Soviet's
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missile site construction and the transportation of missiles
proceeded on an around the clock schedule.

It was essential

that the Russians be prevented from presenting the United
States with a fait accomplis.

The American response had to
222
be fashioned within a matter of days.
This sense of
urgency and its continued increase is reflected in the state
ment by George Ball when he noted "there was . . .

the need

to keep overflying the missile sites several times each day
...

hour by hour around the clock, the launch pads were

being rushed to completion.

Everyone in the room recognized

that once they were operational the danger would take on a
223
new dimension".
The question as seen by those on the Excom was how to
get the missiles out of Cuba, and do it without war.

A

series of "tracks" were looked at throughout the day, co n 
tinuing around the four general proposals mentioned above.
By the end of the day, the group had been narrowed to the
ongoing consideration of an air-strike (the fast track) of
an embargo (the slow track), and the holding of invasion
plans in abeyance as a possibility of last resort.
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On the following morning, 18 October, the President
spoke with Dean Ache son, seeking his advice*

By the end of

the discussion the choices had narrowed down to a choice be
tween the air strike and a blockade*
The Excom met twice this day with the President*
11:00 am the first meeting got underway*
dealt primarily with tactics:

At

This conference

should the President tell

the world about the missiles before acting or not?

The

question was to balance the advantage of surprise against
the moral cost for striking without warning*

It was be

coming obvious that it was not possible to label anyone a
"Hawk" or "Dove"; each

man changed his opinion two or three

times in the course of the discussions*

McGeorge Bundy, for

example, went from the "diplomatic approach" to "do nothing"
224
and finally to the "air strike" camp*
As had become the custom at the start of each Excom
meeting, the intelligence board gave its analysis of the
latest information available*

At this meeting, the board

report significantly raised the level of perceived threat
and sense of compressed time by informing the committee that
the Russians were advancing more rapidly than had previously
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been believed possible and that the first IRBM could be ready
225
to shoot in approximately 18 hours*
The reaction to this
was accurately caught by Abel in his book, The Missile Crisis*
when he noted that "the decision-making machinery was racing
the clock*

There were now two elements of urgency: first

the danger would soon be operational; second, the possibility
that, in spite of all the elaborate security measures, a
226
leak might alert the Kremlin • • •"
Sorenson was later
to reflect on this subject and indicated that "as the week
wore on, the tireless work of the aerial photographers and
photo interpreters gave an even greater sense of urgency to
our deliberations * * • Their (the Soviets) construction had
proceeded at such a pace in these few days, that there could
be no mistake, the Soviets intention to have them operational
much earlier than we had anticipated the knowledge that time
was running out dominated our discussions*

Not one of us at

any time believed that any of the choices before us could
bring anything but prolonged danger or fighting".

227
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Compounding the observations noted above, was the
possibility that Khruschev was deliberately trying to goad
the US into action against Cuba to facilitate a Soviet move
against Berlin*

Such a possibility obviously meant that

the Russians would not be surprised and could take full ad
vantage of whatever was done by the US*

Another considera

tion that had a strong impact on the Excom was the realiza
tion that the impulsive Russian Premier had already made
one major miscalculation in thinking he could get away with
placing missiles in C uba and there was no assurance that he
would not act in a similarly "irrational" manner again. This
concern points up in actual circumstances one of the points
made in the first chapter about the fallacy of positing a
rational being in the normal sense of the word, when he is
acting and reacting in an environment characterized by high
perceived threat and limited time*
The Excom reconvened early that afternoon without the
President, at the suggestion of the Attorney General, hoping
to draw out all views.

The meeting continued into the

evening hours with the advisors broken into two blocs, one
for an air strike and one a blockade.

Through a process of

discussion and an impassioned speech by Robert Kennedy
against another Pearl Harbour - but in reverse, the group

179

came to an uneasy tentative consensus about 8:30 pm that the
blockade (or embargo as it was now called) was the best of a
bad lot*

oo8

crucial factors appeared to be that the

blockade did not initially kill any Russians and provided
flexibility for future maneuver*
The Excom then proceeded to the White House at about
10:00 pm and informed the President of their recommendation*
Kennedy accepted the proposal, as he too had come to the
conclusion that the alternatives had too many insuperable
consequences*

The President then had Sorensen begin a draft

speech to disclose the Russian missiles and the steps the
United States was taking*

Other advisors also began to move

into their areas of expertise to initiate directives and to
prepare for the upcoming confrontation*
The final decision was made the following day, after
giving the air strike faction another chance to state their
case*

At the conclusion of an unexpectedly bitter session,

the President decided on the embargo because of its flexi229
bility and low initial application of forces*
It was then
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decided to make the announcement on Monday the 22nd in order
to ensure all necessary arrangements were completed*

And

so the gauntlet was thrown down; the two predominant world
powers of the post-war era were standing "eyeball to eyeball"*
Only time would tell who would blink first*
Unquestionably a sense of increased threat was per
ceived and time was a dominant factor for the Excom in its
deliberations.
the chapter.

This was well substantiated in the body of
Numerous statements by all of the participants

left little doubt that the national "critical boundaries" had
been penetrated and they consequently perceived high threat
situation and limited time, which were subsequently intensi
fied even more as the days passed.
The increasing sense of threat was based on many
different considerations.

The Bay of Pigs undoubtably was

an underlying factor of considerable importance.

The

President indicated on several occasions during this period
the importance of national and, although unstated, his
personal prestige which was on the line.

The failure of the

administration to identify and accept significant pieces of
information which it was receiving about the Soviet process
of building up Cuba was a direct result of the intelligence
community in general, and the CIA in particular, being dis
credited at the Bay of Pigs.

Khruschevfs erratic personality
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caused additional anxiety because nobody could be sure how
he would react in a US-Soviet confrontation.

Closely tied

with this was the possibility that the whole Russian action
was a plot to provoke the Americans into a reaction.

If

such were the case, what would be the impact of American
action?

Finally there was the bomb - the sense of impending

disaster appeared to grip all of the President's advisors
at one moment or another.
The sense of time compression could also be seen- and
its increasing pressure felt.

The burden of having to con

duct the whole operation under the tightest secrecy took its
toll.

Nobody knew how long it would be before the astute

Washington news corps caught wind of "something big brewing".
The large number of U-2 flights required added to the strain.
How long would it take before the Russians realized the in
creased attention the San Cristobal area was receiving?
Finally, and most critically, the rate of construction at the
site locations and the subsequent downward revisions on the
available time to make a decision, undoutably had a profound
effect on the Excom and its deliberations.

Sorensen and

many others remarked how time became a major determinant of
their strategy options.
It appears from the information presented in this
chapter that none of the working hypotheses have been dis-

confirmed.

The first, dealing with the relationship between

increasing threat perception and the saliency of time, is
demonstrated throughout the chapter.

The second hypothesis,

dealing with immediate as opposed to long range goals, was
supported by the immediate disposal by the President of the
options dealing with "no action" and "diplomatic negotiation"
Although a case could, and in fact was, made for seeing the
move in light of overall nuclear balance, and so a small
change in the status quo, "no action" was never seriously
considered.

When the alternatives that were seriously con

sidered are grouped by their end objective, it becomes read
ily apparent that they all dealt exclusively with techniques
for accomplishing one goal - removal of the missiles from
Cuba*

If it is posited that the long range goal of American

policy is international stability and a significant American
presence in it, then the action taken, which, in the end
saw most of the world seeing Russia as the savior of peace,
was,

in fact, detrimental to our long range interests.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

The time has come to reflect for a moment on the
theoretical grounds from which this enterprise was launched,
their relevance to the crisis periods surveyed, and the
implications which can reasonably be drawn from that analysis.
It was not, and is not here, claimed that this work would
provide definitive explanations to the important (but necessar
ily select) group of questions posed in the first chapter.
The most that could be hoped for here was a reasonably de 
tailed "reconnaisance flight" over the prominent terrain of
the conflict environment and the role of threat perception
and time compression.

Hopefully the work will be found to

be of adequate detail and direction to act as a guide for any
topographer who might follow.
To assist the reader in the discussion to follow, the
three working hypotheses presented at the beginning of this
w ork are provided again.
1.

They are:

As the perception of threat increases, time is seen

as an increasingly salient factor.
2.

As the perception of threat increases, decision183
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makers focus on immediate future needs to the exclusion of
long range considerations.
3.

The shorter the perceived time available to decision

makers the fewer real alternative courses of action will be
considered.
It will be remembered that the analytical framework
to be used depended to a large extent on the reader retaining
before him, as he reads the various chapters, the manifesta
tions posited for individuals and/or groups making policy
decisions in high stress situations.

The individual cases

then were demonstrated through the statements and actions of
those involved and the correlation of these reactions with
those found to be representative of high threat/compressed
time performance.
In the first chapter, a profile was developed which
delineated the nature of the conflict environment and the
importance of several key ideas such as "critical boundary"
and "spiral of effect".

The study by Postman and Bruner

230

was cited for its contribution to the field and several of
its conclusions were presented.

Among the more important

findings germane to this work ware indications that
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perceptual behavior becomes disrupted and less adaptive, that
maladaption in the direction of aggression and escape occurs,
and finally that untested hypotheses are fixated recklessly*
It was noted that a host of studies had identified such mani
festations as increased error rate, use of simpler modes of
response, problem-solving rigidity, and a lowered tolerance
for ambiguity as characteristic of individuals or groups in
high threat, crisis situations*

Indications were given that

perceived time compression was frequently an accompanying
factor and compounded the difficulties for the DM unit* Con
sequences of time pressure tended to cause responses which
increased propensity to rely on stereotypes, acted to disrupt
problem-solving activities, and impeded the use of available
information and exploration of alternatives*
This explains how people are said to function, or
rather mal-function, during periods of crisis*

What does the

information generated from the case studies indicate?

July

1914 undoubtably supports the researchers' findings almost
to the point*

The time factor was a particularly effective

example of the critical importance of perception v. reality
231
to the individuals concerned*
Unquestionably the key

231
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Decision-Makers in Europe had a much greater objective period
of time available to them to attempt to attenuate the develop
ing confrontation than was available in any of the other
studies*

However what was perceived, and what was acted on,

is an application of the Thomas Therom mentioned in the first
chapter - the decision making elites saw the time as short and
so it was in its consequences to the problem-solving process*
With an equally high level of assurance it can be said that
all decision-makers focused on their immediate interests to
the exclusion, and in fact detriment, of their long-range
objectives*

Certainly prior to July of 1914 no one would have

accepted as credible the claim that Europe would be drawn into
its most devastating war over the death of the heir-apparent
to the Hapsburg throne*
The period leading up to the start of World War I was
also an excellent example of two of the elements that act
upon, and are acted upon, by the conflict environment* England
demonstrated in its military and cabinet deliberations during
the crisis period a strong sense of extended natural bounda
ries; the north coast of France came rapidly to be considered
an essential part of Britain's defense perimeter and its occu232
pation by an unfriendly force - Germany, was unacceptable*

232
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T h e second element, spiral of effect, worked in textbook
fashion between Germany and Russia during the later part of
the crisis, and is the most satisfactory explanation for the
frenzied activities on both sides in the last few days of
July 1914, and for the increased influence that the military
was able to wield on their respective D M units*

It should

be noted, too, that this process became more influential as
the level of perceived threat and time compression increased*
A flashback to the second chapter and the level of involve
ment of, say, Britain and Germany in the early part of the
crisis as compared with that in late July bears ample proof
of the relationship*
The study which followed transplanted the reader some
36 years ahead into the summer of 1950 and into a decision
that was to have ramifications far beyond the formal cease
fire finally signed.

Again, it would appear that the facts

of the case support the hypotheses.

Time was unquestionably

salient in this case and in fact demonstrates probably the
most severe impact on the D M process of any of the studies*
The tremendous distances betv;een those on the scene responsi
ble for implementing directions and those responsible for
generating them unquestionably acted to accentuate the sense
of time compression*

233
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Reports from Korea and from SCAF

Glenn Paige, Truman's Decision: The United States Enters
the Korean War (New York, 19?70) 198.
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continuously pressed home the need to act almost immediately*
Just as definitely it can be seen that the immediate
needs or goals, as then perceived by the Truman decision
making unit, eclipsed the long range goals established and
proclaimed during the previous several years*

Korea had been

declared to be outside the US Asian defense perimeter and of
no particular importance to vital American concerns*

Yet the

decision was made to commit ground forces and actively support
anti-communist governments throughout the Southeast Asia area;
effectively committing the United States to envolvement on
the Asian land mass it has steadfastly said it wanted no part
of .
The case for the third proposition (search for altern
atives) is equally strong.

Numerous authoritative sources

support the fact that there were vitually no alternatives
recommended.

Time was seen as so critical that the need for

action was predominant.
The case of Korea is an excellent example of another
of the characteristics of problem-solving in stress environ
ments.

Stereotypes and simplification in problem recognition

were noted by several authors, although not in that terminolo
gy, when describing President Truman's propensity for finding
correlaries in recent history for the actions taken by the
NKPLA*

The attack was compared to the Nazi attack on Poland,

189
and the idea of letting the North Koreans continue unopposed
was likened to the disasterous appeasement process prior to
W W II.

A monolithic communism was seen as "extending its

tentacles in a master plan to topple or dominate" all govern
ments in the area.

The complexity and implications of the

commitments made in those few days was completely subsumed
in the vision of an ultimate mission of the United States to
prevent the Communist juggernaut from crushing an"outpost of
the free world" — the question rapidly came to be viev/ed in
terms of good and evil, with the proper choice preordained.
Closely related to America's entry into the Korean war,
conclusions about China's big step proved considerably more
tentative and impressionistic.

Working with Inadequate

primary sources, it appears that a reasonably strong case can
be made for at least two of the three hypotheses.

The

saliency of time was demonstrated in China's correspondence
and the rapid rise in its bellicosity, as the U N forces
approached the 38th parallel.

234

Indirect communications,

particularly those carried by K. M. Pannikar, the Indian
Ambassador to Peking, showed a significant rise in the
reference to

tiir.3

and the necessity for action within a
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specified distance/time if a positive response was not re 
ceived by the CPR government.

The validity of the second

hypothesis, attention to immediate goals, can be demonstrated
with somewhat more certainty.

Unquestionably the long-term

interest of the CPR leadership was for sin extended period of
peace.

This was a brand new government, first declared on

October 1, 1949, which was attempting, simultaneously, to
quell the remaining KMT bands roving in South China, profoundly
alter the life-style of a nation of 600 million, and take on
the strongest country in the world in a wax 1

It takes no

great interpretive ability to see that the Chinese D M unit
could have done very nicely without the last concern.
The last proposition dealing with the consideration of
alternatives is unfortunately beyond the resources of the
author.

However, knowing that other actions in which there

were significant differences of opinion ware reflected in
muted form in New China or World Culture. leads the author
to suspect that had there been a major divergence of opinion
within the decision-making group it would have surfaced.
There was no such indication.

Additionally, the extensive

ideological filtering through which all events were processed
makes it improbable that there was any serious consideration
of any approach that would be contrary to the "world-struggle"
precept of their ideological make-up.

This latter point is

immediately related to the stereotype phenomenon mentioned
above.

It would seem to be a reasonable assumption that the

ideological sense of the Chinese decision-makers greatly
facilitated the probability of their perceiving events in a
stereotype pattern.

Additionally, this is another fine

example of the process of determining a national extended
critical boundary.

China came to identify the demilitarized

zone as its outer boundary and a zone about half way up North
Korea as its critical national boundary.
The final case study was unique in several aspects; it
was the only one considered which occurred after the advent
of effective ICBM technology; it involved sophisticated
communications systems vastly speeding up the reaction process
and, most important to this study, it was the only one that
did not conclude in a decision for war.

The fact that such

was the case does not mean that the propositions were proven
false.

It was, and is, possible to avoid the movement to war

whilst still facing the same forces as those crises which do
end in war, otherwise the world would be in a constant state
of open warfare.
The chapter on Cuba left no doubt that time was a
salient factor throughout the crisis period, and an increas
ingly important one as the crisis period progressed.

The rate

at which the Russians were able to build the launch sites,

coupled with the always present fear that the Soviets would
discover the frequent U-2 flights (there were 20 between
October 15th and the 22nd)
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acted in concert to simul

taneously increase the level of perceived threat and the im
portance of time itself.

The evidence presented also makes

a strong case for the belief that the Kennedy DM unit focused
on the immediate needs in front of them rather than longrange goals which included the lessening of tension in the
international arena and dismantling of the "gun-boat diplo
macy" image often associated with American foreign policy.
It comes as a surprise to most students of this event (as it
did to the author) to discover that it is the Russians whom
the majority of the rest of the world gives credit for * 236
avoiding war in 1962.
Certainly it is true also that none
of the many commentators on the events of those hectic days
mentioned any significant effort by those involved to balance
the gains to be obtained against any previously stated program
of long-range goals or objectives.
It is the case of the third proposition that the Cuban
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crisis does not support the hypothesis in question.

Even with

a short reaction time, the Excom considered a wide array of
alternatives and continued to do so throughout the crisis
period.

However, it is the contention of Ole Holsti, support

ed by the author, that the result was the product of a highly
unique factor of this crisis which altered significantly the
resultant problem-solving approach.

That factor was that the

discovery of the missiles had effectively been kept secret
from the Russians and the American people.

Thus, in essence,

the Excom was able to work with a semi-static situation in
which the opponent was not taking any actions to counter the
US preparations, and secondly, the DM unit did not have to
face the tremendous pressures for immediate action that would
have undoubtably been brought to bear had the American public
known about the missiles.

President Kennedy himself was

later to comment that the ability to delay a decision after
the receipt of the photographic evidence of missile sites
was crucial to the content of American policy:

"if we had

had to act on Wednesday (17 October), in the first 24 hours,
I don't think probably we would have chosen as prudently as
we finally did . .
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What then is the impact of the studies conducted on the
efficacy of the three propositions presented for investigation?
It is the opinion of the author that the first two hypotheses,
dealing with the saliency of time and the primacy of immediate
goals, have, with a reasonably high degree of assurance, shown
themselves to be accurate statements*

The final hypothesis

dealing with alternatives, is somewhat less secure*

It would

certainly be an over-statement to say that it was disconfirmed,
but it also would be unjustified to say the opposite*

At most

it could be stated that it appeaurs that it is probably valid,
but more definitive investigation will be required to go beyond
that point.
From the analysis above, it is possible to develop
graphically a representation of these relationships*

They

appear aLS follows:
Threat, Time And Decision-Making

Crisis induced

Over estimate
• en. aDixxxy to
strike fast

Tendency to
act quickly
A

a I
ij

Concern for
perceived timejjv immed« not
pressure
M distant future 1
fewer alt*
perceived
Tendency to act
less effectively
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It would appear then from these cases, that there
exists a reasonably clear relationship between perceived
threat, time compression and crisis decision-making.

Threat

then becomes a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in the
conflict environment.

Threat, or the level of threat * is

probably the single most important factor in the decision-making
process in internationalcrises.

If this be the case, then fu

ture efforts to control, dissipate or eliminate situations
and/or actions which generally precipitate high threat situa
tions should prove of great value in the continuing search for
conflict control.
The conclusion one draws from this study is sobering;
that men rarely perform at their best under stress.

The most

probable casualties of high threat are the very abilities
which distinguish man from other species; to establish logi
cal links between present actions and future goals; to create
novel responses to new circumstances; to communicate complex
ideas; to deal with abstractions; to perceive not only black
and white, but also the many shades of grey in between; to
distinguish valid analogies from false ones, and sense from
nonsense.

With respect to these precious attributes, the

law of supply and demand seems to operate in a perverse
manner; as crisis increase the need for them, it also appears
to diminish the supply.

A persuasive case can be made that

196
crisis-induced stress often affects behavior in ways that are
inconsistent with calculated policy making*

In the absence

of evidence to the controversy, there is no reason to believe
that the ability to cope with intense stress has materially
improved since 1914.
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Thus, even if the findings represent

tendencies rather than laws of crisis behavior, they may
provide soma assistance for speculation about policy-making
under crisis conditions*
A flow diagram intergrating salient features of the
previous models and crisis policy making appears in appendix J*
As promised in the introduction section to this thesis,
an effort will be made to present observations that would
assist in retarding the effects of high threat.

The actions

listed below could be expected to assist in managing conflict
situations:
1*

Where relative capabilities is a major component

of the crisis decision, the decision-making group should call
on information that is at variance with the prevailing consen
sus*
2*

When decision makers operate under stress, they do
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not seek or accept the advice of habitual critics and so
should listen closely to the criticisms from trusted advisors*
3.

Decision-makers should be specific in establishing

limits in instructions to the military and should provide a
check system to insure compliance.
4.

Concious efforts should be made to increase

sensitivity to the adversary*s frame of reference*
5.

D M ’s should avoid taking steps that seal off the

opponents ftescape routes".
6*

Every effort should be made to slow the pace of

crisis events*
7.

Care must be taken to recognize the military’s

institutional perspective and limited range of concern when
accepting their advice.
The final commitment made at the beginning of the
enterprise was to provide additional working hypotheses on
the basis of this research.

The following appear to the au

thor to be worthy of further pursuit:
1*

In a crisis situation decision-makers will tend

to perceive the range of their own alternatives to be more
restricted than those of their adversaries.
2.

As stress increases, decision-makers will tend to

perceive the range of alternatives open to them as becoming
narrower.
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3#
rely more
4.

As threat increases, decision-makers will tend to
on ad hoc groups.
There is a positive relationship between X fs ex

pression of hostility to Y and Y ’s perception of threat.
5.

In a crisis situation, there is a tendency to

perceive o n e ’s central value as severely threatened and then

to distinguish many other important values also threatened.
6.

The closer an adversary acts to o n e ’s psychological

space, the greater the sense of threat to o n e ’s values.
7.

The greater the perceived threat, the less the

frequency of interaction.
8.
crease the

Increased threat and shortened time tend to in
tendency towards rigidity of perception and thought.

We are rapidly approaching the end of this investigation.
This does not by any means mean that the questions axe e x 
hausted.

Scientific investigation is like the pursuit of the

horizon, every step opens new perspectives, a solution of
any problem always raises a host of new questions.

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGY - W W I
28 June - Archduke Franz Ferdinand assassinated in
Sarejevo

5 July - Kaiser gives ,rblank check11 at Potsdam meeting
with special Austrian emissary
10 July - Count Tiza convinced to support action against
Serbia
11 July - Austrian investigator turns up no conclusive evi
dence of Serbia colusion - report ignored
18 July - Saznov warns Austria the Russians will not stand
by and see Serbia attacked
20 July - Poincare* arrives in Russia
- Poincare* issues a similar statement from
Russia as Saznov*s of 18 July
23 July - Poincare* leaves on return trip to France
- Austria delivers ultimatum to Serbia

25 July - Austria rejects Serbia's reply
- Saznov requests partial mobilization
26 July - Saznov orders "Period Preparatory to War"
- France begins protecting R R ’s, recalls troops
27 July - Germany begins to get reports of Russian
mobilization
28 July - Austria declares war on Serbia
29 July -

Poincare* lands at D unkirk
Austria bombards Belgrad
Russia decides on general mobilization
"Willy-Nicky1* telegrams indicate Russian preparat
Bethiuann attempts to gain British neutrality

30 July - Germany declares "threatening danger of war11 and
sends telegram to Czar requesting mobilization
be stopped
31 July

-

General

Joffre demands France mobilize

1

Aug - Russia says cannot stop mobilization for
reasons"
- Germany mobilizes
- France mobilizes

2

Aug - Britain commits fleet to protection of France's
north coast

3

Aug - Germany declares war-invades Belgium
- France declares war

4

Aug

"technical

- England declares war when Germany refuses to leave
Belgium

APPENDIX B
DECISION-MAKING UNITS:

1914 CRISIS
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APPENDIX C-2

APPENDIX D
CHRONOLOGY

-

KOREA (US)

12 January 1951 - Acheson declares Korea outside US defense
perimeter
19 January - House Representatives defeats Korean Supple
mentary Aid Bill
30 January - President asks for security re-evaluation
10 May - South Korean government warns NKPLA moving large
numbers of troops south
18 June - SCAP briefs JCS Chief and Secretary of Defense
that no immediate danger exists
25 June - NKPLA attacks
- James sends first report to Washington
- Ambassador Muccro sends report
- Acheson informed and calls President at
Independence, Missouri
- First meeting at Blair Mouse - fleet in Formosan
Straight, aircraft support dependent withdrawal
26 June - Military situations worsens in Korea
- Second Biair House meeting - more aggressive air
cover, strengthening MAG *s
- UNCOK report verified NKPKA invasion of ROK
- Dewey pledges bi-partisan support
27 June

- No major actions - continued monitoring or reports

28 June

- MacArthur conducts personal recon of battle
- Continued scanning of reports by Washington

29 June

area

- Reports indicate ROKA in bad shape
- President presides over NSC meeting - decides to
allow aircremrt to pursue over North Korea, send it
ground troops to secure Pusan harbours
- 1 RCT authorized for commitment for defense of
Pusan harbour

June - MacArthur’s personal recon indicates desperate
situation
- last major conference held at White H0use authorized SCAP to commit nall resources at your
command”

APPENDIX E
DECISION - MAKING UNIT:
KOREA 1950 (US)

POSITION

NAME

President

Harry S. Truman

Secretary of State

Dean Acheson

Secretary of Defense

Louis Johnson

Secretary of the Army

Frank Pace

Secretary of the Air Force

Thomas Finletter

Secretary of the Navy

Francis Matthews

Chairman - JCS

Omar Bradley

Army Chief of Staff

General Collins

Air Force Chief of Staff

General Vanderberg

Chief Naval Operations

Admiral Sherman

Asst. Secretary for Far East

Dean Rusk

Asst. Secretary for UN

John Hickerson

Under Secretary of State

Frank Webb

Ambassador at Large

Phillip Jessup

APPENDIX F
CHRONOLOGY:

CHINESE INTERVENTION 1950

24 June - NKPLA attacks across 38th parallel
27 June - US neutralizes Formosan Straights
30 June - US intervenes on side of South Korea
13 August - Chinese first given indications of possible
NKPLA defeat
17 August - Austin states UN should reunite all of Korea
20 August - Chou sends telegram to U N stating C h i n a fs
interest in Korean question
25 August - Matthews says:
compel peace"

US should "institute war to

26 August - Article in World Culture states China must be
included in solution
27 August - US planes alleged to have attacked Chinese
territory
6 Sept - Malik*s attempt for pro-communist peace fails
15 Sept - Inchon landing
25 Sept - PanikkaT told China not to allow US on its borders
30 Sept - Chou gives strong warning about anyone
"slaughtering" her neighbors
1 Oct

- MacArthur gives North Korea surrender ultimatum

2 Oct

- Chou states China enter war if US crosses 38th
parallel

7 Oct

- UN resolves to "take all steps necessary11 in Korea

9 Oct - MacArthur gives North Korea final surrender ultimatum
10 Oct - Chou En Lai warns China "not stand by idly"
(last warning)
16 Oct - China Crosses Yalu

APPENDIX G
CHRONOLOGY - CUBAN CRISIS

14 July - C h e f Gueverra goes to Moscow
late July 1962 - Indications appear of increased shipping
from Russia to Cuba
22 August - McCone advises Kennedy of possible missile
emplacement
24 August - State Department discloses Soviet military
supplies and personnel are increasing
I September - Senator Keating claims 1200 Soviet troops in
Cuba
II September - Soviets warn against interfering v/ith ships
13 September - President declares US will "take necessary
action" against Cuba
19 September - Board estimates admit missiles a possibility
in Cuba but state as "unlikely"
20 September - Senate resolution passed authorizing the
President to call up reserves
21 September - First reliable reports of large 'weapons in Cuba
29 September - U-2 photos shov/ first S A - 2 ’s in position
4 October - Khruschev promises no problems during election
period
6 October - IL-28 bombers identified in Cuba
14 October - U-2 flight over San Cristobal

15 October - First verification of ballistic missile site
construction
- Major presidential advisors informed
16 October -

MacNamara holds initial meeting
Bundy informs President
First meeting of Excora
President goes campaigning in Connecticut
Excom discusses major alternatives in detail

17 October - First identification of IRBM’S in Cuba
- Serious consideration narrowed to two "tracks"
(air-blockade)
18 October - U-2 indicates missile sites more advances than
expected
- Determined not to have a "reverse Pearl Harbour"
- Tenative agreement or embargo
19 October - Final agreement or embargo
- Departments begin preparations for confrontation
22 October - President announces embargo effective 24 October

APPENDIX H
DECISION-MAKING UNIT:
CUBAN CRISIS 1962

Position

Name

President

John Kennedy

Attorney General

Robert Kennedy

Secretary of State

Dean Rusk

Secretary of Defense

R 0bert McNamara

Presidential Assistant for
National Security Affairs

McGeorge Bundy

Chief,

ICS

Maxwell Taylor

Chief, DIA

General Carter

Secretary of the Treasury

Douglas Dillon

Advisor to the President

Theodore Sorensen
Kenneth O ’Donnell
Charles Bohlen
Alexis Johnson

Deputy Defense Secretary

Roswell Gilpatrick

Under Secretary of State

George Ball

Asst* Secretary of State

Edwin Martin
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